DigitalCommons@Bryant University

Title

A Test of the Loans Prohibition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Are Firms That Grant Loans To Executives More Likely To Misstate Their Financial Results?

Authors

Charles P. Cullinan, Bryant University
Hui Du, University of Texas - Pan American
Gail B. Wright, Bryant University

Document Type

Article

Comments

Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy Volume 25, Issue 4, pages 485-497.

Bryant University users may access this article here.

Publication Source

Journal of Accounting and Public Policy

Abstract

This article examines whether executive loans are associated with financial misstatements. This article finds a significant association between executive loans and financial misstatements.

Recommended Citation

Cullinan, Charles P.; Du, Hui; and Wright, Gail B., "A Test of the Loans Prohibition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Are Firms That Grant Loans To Executives More Likely To Misstate Their Financial Results?" (2006). Accounting Journal Articles. Paper 23.
http://digitalcommons.bryant.edu/acc_jou/23