Bryant University
HONORS THESIS

It's Complicated: President Trump's Relationship with the Media

BY JOSEPH IAMELE

ADVISOR • Dr. Richard Holtzman
EDITORIAL REVIEWER • Dr. John Dietrich

_____

It's Complicated: President Trump's Relationship with the Media

Bryant University Honors Program
Honors Thesis
Student's Name: Joseph Iamele
Faculty Advisor: Richard Holtzman
Editorial Reviewer: John Dietrich
April 2020

Table of Contents

It's Complicated: President Trump's Relationship with the Media
Honors Thesis for Joseph Iamele

ABSTRACT

Through an evolution of presidential communication and the development of newer communications technology, a symbiotic relationship between the president and media outlets has emerged. The president, attempting to communicate his messages to as much of the American public as possible, relies on media to spread his messages. Media outlets, on the other hand, would rather focus on more negative or drama filled aspects of the presidency. This results from a profit motive in the media industry that requires outlets to continuously gain readership, viewership and, subscribers. The best way to gain these is not by reporting the president's policy accomplishments, but rather by reporting on topics such as partisan disagreements and scandals which the public finds significantly more interesting. Realizing these motives, the president does his best to try and influence media into acting in a manner that is favorable to them. The effectiveness of this strategy is hotly debated; however, it is generally accepted that in at least some circumstances, the president can exert some sort of influence on the way media behaves. President Trump, for example, has been able to constantly keep media attention on him through a feedback loop in which he tweets, the tweet receives press coverage, he responds to such coverage, which is then reported on again by the press. To analyze the success or failure of these tactics, this study recorded data from state public opinion polls near an event where the President had sufficient media exposure and a month later to uncover any trends or impacts. The use of state polls will also help to simulate the electoral college and potentially provide insight into how the President may fare in a reelection campaign through continued use of his media communication strategies.

INTRODUCTION

President Trump's interactions with media outlets have often been acknowledged as unorthodox or strange by his opposition. His Twitter presence is loved by some while despised by others. To gain the admiration of his base, Trump discredits news organizations that are hostile to him while building up those that cover him in a positive light. Also, to the delight of his followers, President Trump continued to hold large campaign style rallies despite already sitting in the Oval Office. Such behavior has perplexed many minds across the US as it has not been seen at this scale in the near past. It is especially astonishing considered the more laid-back administration that lacked campaign style rallies and rampant Twitter usage under President Barack Obama that had existed for eight years prior. While his techniques may seem strange, ultimately, President Trump is simply acting in a manner that aligns with older presidential communication strategies of appealing to the public and building an image through an almost continual campaign process. In fact, most, if not all, of what President Trump does in these rallies attempts to create a lasting image for himself that receives constant attention from the news media…and he has succeeded in doing so. Through Twitter alone, President Trump has created a feedback loop in which the President continuously tweets about media outlets and those outlets constantly respond by covering those tweets, giving him a steady presence in the news. This strategy by President Trump could have potential ramifications for media strategies of future presidents given either the success or failure of Trump's tactics to increase his popularity.

LITERATURE REVIEW

<u>The President and the Public</u>

The Presidency has not always been the focal point of the American public, media, and government. Article 2 of the Constitution outlines the roles and powers of the executive in the American political system but does so in a limited way that allows for interpretation. Much of the reason that this Article was so vague was the American public was still suspicious of any position that resembled monarchical rule (Bump, 2017, 1). Despite the vague language, many early presidents abided strictly to the roles outlined in Article 2. The passage of time, however, changed this disposition. Beginning with President Roosevelt, the office of the president began to drift away from the strict adherence to the language in Article 2 of the Constitution. Rather, Roosevelt's perspective used the public as a source of power, laying the foundation for future Presidents to make expansive claims of power. President Roosevelt (served 1901 – 1909) explains in his autobiography, "I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the nation could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution" (1913, 43). President Roosevelt's statement reveals his belief that the role of the president was to preserve the public good and act in the general interest of the public, and that, rather than being constrained to the duties outlined in Article 2, the president should act in any way necessary to help the public as long as not prohibited by the Constitution. Later in his writing, Roosevelt even goes on to acknowledge that he broadened the use of executive power during his office, citing the public good as his source of power. This broadening of power continued with President Woodrow Wilson (served 1913 – 1921)

who acknowledged that presidential power had grown that to the point that the president

should not only work to find out what the people want, but also try to guide and craft their

opinion. He states in his autobiography, "[The President] can dominate his party by being

spokesman for the real sentiment and purpose of the country, by giving direction to opinion,

by giving the country at once the information and the statement of policy which will enable it

to form its judgments alike of parties and of men" (1908, 47). Wilson, based on research of

American government and his own interpretation of the Constitution is asserting that the

Presidency should be transformed into a more political position by influencing the public's

beliefs. The objective in doing so, to relate back to the ideas of Roosevelt, is to shape public

opinion to convince Americans that a policy is for their own good and something they should

support. In order to sway public opinion, however, the President must have a close

relationship with the public in order to communicate policies and to promote his image.

While this was originally done through more primitive modes of mass media, such as

newspaper and radio, the advent of television and Twitter, as current President Donald Trump

displays, brought Presidential communication and its impact into a new age.

Presidential Communication
Just as the source of president's claims of power have shifted from the Constitution to the

American public, the primary target of presidential communication has also shifted, this time

from Congress to the public. Throughout much of the history of the office, Presidents have

utilized legislative persuasion skills with Congress in order to maximize chances for

successful policy outcome (Wayne, 2009, 314). While some presidents were extremely

successful using these legislative skills, such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt in negotiating

New Deal legislation, a trend began in which Presidents switched to appealing directly to the public. This shift coincided with the evolution of the public presidency and the move of the presidential role from an executive official focused on policy passage to a party leader looking to sway political opinion. In the 1980s, Samuel Kernell describes this new trend as "going public". Kernell explains that, "It is a strategy whereby a president promotes himself and his policies in Washington by appealing to the American public for support" (1987, 2). Through this policy, the president can "go over the heads" of Congress by attempting to move public opinion directly. The strategy is that, by skipping the decision makers in Congress and appealing directly to the public, the president can influence said decision makers through their constituents. If the President can successfully employ this strategy, Congress members will be forced to comply with his policy proposals or risk being voted out for someone who would support the president's policies. Kernell goes on to explain that while these ideas had been developing for many years, they truly became legitimized and used routinely with the development of modern systems of transportation and mass communication (1987, 2). Thus, "going public" became popular with the advent of television and, now, social media.

Some scholars dispute the effectiveness of this strategy, however. George C. Edwards and B. Dan Wood conducted a study looking into the effectiveness of presidential influence over both foreign and domestic policy. According to their study, "Our findings regarding the ability of the president to set the agenda of Congress and media are mixed. Most of the time, all three react to events and issues, even in the foreign policy arena" (1999, 341). Their findings urge skepticism in the President's ability to dominate the political system. This is a direct result to the routines that Congress and media outlets have established and follow daily.

For example, Congress has to worry about issues such as budgeting, protection of civil rights, and abiding by treaty obligations, while media outlets have routines such as deciding news that is of high value to Americans and assigning correspondents to report on a wide range of issues. These routines make it difficult for the president to exert influence over each institution, thus making it challenging for him to dominate the political system. All hope for the president is not lost, however, as there are certain circumstances under which the president is able to exert some form of influence. Edwards and Wood explain, "Nevertheless, we find evidence that the president can act in an entrepreneurial fashion to focus the attention of others in the system. If an issue is not already part of ongoing media coverage or congressional hearings, then the president may be able to set the agenda of the networks and Congress" (1999, 342). Thus, if media outlets or Congress is not currently focused on an issue, the President may be able to implant it into their agendas by bringing some form of attention to it. President Trump, for example, may use Twitter to do this. While this may be useful for policymaking, this is not necessarily the intention of presidents in the modern era. Today, as referenced above, presidents focus less on attempting to influence the political system for the benefits of easier policymaking, and instead attempt to inflate their image.

Image and public opinion have always been important to those sitting as the executive officer. In recent years, however, the image of the President has become increasingly important. Jeremy D. Mayer, acknowledges this, stating that "The image of the president, the impression Americans have of their chief executive as a leader and a human being is vitally important to the success of any modern president" (2004, 621). Mayer explains that image is built up each day and, eventually becomes more difficult to change than any governmental policy.

According to his analysis, there are four major components to presidential image. They are as follows: the president's character (talents, worldview, and style), the emphasis and submergence of specific traits, partisanship, and media acting as a referee determining what aspects of image are correct and which are not. Altogether, these four components aid the president, as well as his team, in the creation of an image that, hopefully, presents the president in a positive light in the eyes of the public. Furthermore, Mayer states, that while image is based off the president themselves, a great deal of work goes on behind the scenes to make sure that the president's more positive traits are displayed while containing their fewer positive traits. Mayer uses the example of President George W. Bush and the set design of his appearances in media, stating that if the public is going to get a single view of the president every day, it should be a positive one. For example, President Bush was often portrayed as a strong war-time leader in his appearances in media. The President's media team identified this as one of his strengths and tried to emphasize it every chance they could. Thus, after "major hostilities" were ended in Iraq in April of 2003, President Bush's staff put together a big event in which the President landed on the deck of an aircraft carrier and emerged in a pilot's suit before changing and making a speech in front of a large banner that read "Mission Accomplished" (Mayer, 2004, 628). This event was generally viewed in a positive manner, received a great deal of media attention and coincided exactly with Mayer statement about the public receiving a positive image of the president.

Bruce Miroff offers a more in depth take of this image making process and describes events such as those that President Bush took part in as presidential spectacles. Miroff, too, argues that, in order to govern successfully, presidents have always needed the support of the public

and that in order to gain this support, as a result of the emergence of television and social media, it is essential that presidents partake in these spectacles that he describes as "symbol events" (2018, 231). It is explained that these events are meaningful not for what they achieve, but what they signify. Miroff likens the spectacle to a professional wrestling match. He states it differs from a boxing match in the sense that boxing is a competition in which the actual outcome matters. In a professional wrestling, however, the outcome is pre-determined and what truly matters are the gestures and the portrayal of the distinctive characters. Miroff, building on the ideas of Mayer, explains that not only do presidential media and communications teams build up the traits that are most attractive of a candidate, they emphasize those traits that contrast those most heavily criticized from the prior administration. For example, "Trump, following a president criticized for excessive deliberation and caution, has disdained the need for expert knowledge and dismissed the risks in impulsive decision making" (Miroff, 2018, 233). The idea is that presidents will appear more successful, or better poised for success than their predecessor, thus inflating their image. Miroff's work presents a distinct difference, from Mayer's work, though. While Mayer's focus on image includes its potential impact on policy making, Miroff's does less so, instead solely focusing on maintaining public approval in a highly partisan environment. In fact, Miroff's work more closely aligns with Hugh Heclo's study into what he calls the "permanent campaign". Heclo argues, like Miroff, that public approval is more important for the president's overall image and less on policy making, so much so that he states that modern day presidents are in a state of permanent campaigning. Heclo states that this "permanent campaign" is a "…combination of image making and strategic calculation that turns governing into a perpetual campaign and remakes government into an instrument designed to

sustain an elected official's popularity" (2000, 172). The permanent campaign and focus on image clearly align with the idea of the public presidency outlined by President Wilson. Through the voracious pursuit of public approval, presidents are becoming more political through events such as the spectacle, for example, which essentially promote rhetoric, boast about the president's accomplishments and their success in comparison, to their predecessor. To use the President Trump example again, despite already being elected, the President has continued to host rallies meant to boost his approval and image and tweet to defend said image while attacking others he identifies as competition. Just as the prior image making policies benefited from the advent of better mass communication technology, so too does the permanent campaign. Today, the most important technologies to utilize for these strategies are the television and social media, more specifically, Twitter.

The Role of Social Media and Traditional Media in Politics
Presidents are constantly looking to promote themselves through image building and appealing to the public. In order to do this, though, the president must be able to effectively utilize the forms of media outlets available to them. Luckily, given the grandeur of the president in the eyes of Americans, media outlets are constantly looking to report on the president to achieve viewership and readership. This constant focus gives the president many opportunities to relay a message and, subsequently, shape public opinion. Marjorie Randon Hershey describes this relationship in greater detail. She states,

> "…presidents absolutely need media coverage. Without it, they lose one of their primary means of influencing action in Congress and protecting their own popularity. The media need presidents as well, but for different reasons. Journalists' aim is not to enhance presidents' popularity but to find audiences for media outlets, and news about

presidents is a major draw for viewers, listeners, and readers. In short, presidents have a symbiotic relationship with the media: they depend on one another" (2018, 256).

While there is a symbiotic relationship in place regarding two of the major players of the American political system, tension does arise because each has different goals. The president wants media outlets to rave about their accomplishments, promote their policies, and inflate their image. Journalists, on the other hand, would prefer to report about strategic and partisan maneuvering because it is more interesting for their audiences. Thus, Presidents invest a great deal of effort into attempting to control the press through methods such as hiring communications directors to speak on behalf of the president and prevent leaks of information (Hershey, 2018, 257). Despite such efforts to separate the president from mass media as much as possible, the chief executive is still in need of the press to communicate his messages. In the past, presidents rarely, if ever, got an opportunity to speak to a large portion of the public all at once, but, with the introduction of mass communication technologies such as television, presidents were given a reliable way to relay messages, promote policy, and, ultimately, promote himself. This is beginning to change, however, with the increasing use of social media in the political realm, as evidenced in the past election and current administration. Nonetheless, for the time being, Americans still predominantly get their news from television (Mitchell, 2018).

Twitter and Facebook have been proven to be crucial to the campaign of contemporary political figures, as evidenced by the success of Donald Trump. While his social media use surely helped the current President reach a wide audience of users that used social media rather than television as their primary source of news, any candidate or president would be

foolish to totally abandon television as an outlet for promoting themselves. According to the Pew Research Center, "Television continues to rank first as the preferred platform. Just over four-in-ten U.S. adults (44%) prefer TV, compared with about a third (34%) who prefer the web, 14% who prefer radio and 7% who prefer print" (Mitchell, 2018). While television remains the preferred method of receiving news in general, respondents who answered that they prefer to receive their news "online" jumped six percentage points from 2016 to 2018 compared to a fall of two percentage points for television. While this indicates a rise in social media news consumption that may overtake television soon, more refined statistics uncover the continued dominance of the television set. Altogether, almost half of Americans (47%) prefer to watch the news, either online or on television, rather than absorb it by reading or listening to it. Of these 47% who prefer to watch the news, the Pew Research Center finds that "Among the roughly half of U.S. adults who prefer to watch their news, the vast majority – 75% - prefer the television as a mode for watching; 20% of watchers prefer the web" (include author, if there is one, and year here). On the other hand, 63% percent of those who prefer to read their news, choose social media as their preferred source. Thus, for the time being, Americans still, predominantly, watch television to receive their news. This very well could change as younger generations come to voting age. However, the Pew Research Center also found that adults younger than 50 are more likely than those who are older than 50 to receive their news from the internet, regardless of format, displaying the increasing importance of social media and the internet in general. With the rise of online based news, though, comes an astonishing phenomenon. As more people absorb news online and share it on social media, internet-based news sources and traditional media outlets are becoming far more co-dependent on one another.

Just as a symbiotic relationship has emerged among the president and media, another symbiotic relationship has emerged between traditional media and social media. In a study of the 2012 presidential election, Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha uncovered this co-dependency. He found that a candidate's presence on social media, such as number of Twitter followers or number of Facebook likes, typically approximated the candidates' placement in polls which, in turn, approximated the amount of traditional news coverage that they received (2015, 139). Simultaneously, Eshbaugh-Soha explains, traditional media impacts what is being reported as news on social media, although, typically in a more critical manner. As evidence, "Whereas social media were more negative, they still tend to follow traditional news coverage, which, as expected, follows regular events - both scheduled and not - throughout the election campaign" (2015, 147). While this specific example applies directly to the campaign process, one can also make the connection to news post-election. He further explains, like Hershey (2018), that traditional media follows a "profit-seeker model" in which news outlets attempt to report on topics that readers, viewers, and listeners will find interesting in order to attract a larger audience, impacting what they can charge advertisers.

This same profit motive has also trickled down to social media as more people begin to report news through the medium. Following the chase of audiences found in traditional media, social media companies target users' preferences using algorithms. Despite the rise of importance and usage of social media, Eshbaugh-Soha argues that traditional media remains the dominant player in reporting the news and that the co-dependency only reinforces that dominance. While still highlighting the mutually beneficial relationship, Vivian Roese (2018)

believes that social media is becoming the dominant news source, impacting how traditional

media behaves. In her study, Roese explains the idea of the media hype, which she describes

as topics that are relevant, of high news value, and spread easily. She also identifies a

phenomenon she describes as the accidental media hype, which are typically social media

user generated and become viral because they trigger some form of deep emotion in viewers.

Despite the powerful effects that these media hypes can have, they are inherently limited by a

growing use of algorithms in order to determine what posts users will be shown (2018, 322).

In this sense Roese agrees with Eshbaugh-Soha's explanation of the profit motive extending

to social media and the attempts of social media companies to determine what users want to

view. Despite this flaw, Roese is still confident that social media will become the dominant

source of news for Americans. She states,

> "This interconnectivity also enhances interdependence: News media are economically
> dependent on social media and its users. Social media are economically dependent on
> the users and, to some extent, on news media. The users appear to be dependent on
> social media as part of their everyday lives and sources of information. They are also
> dependent on news media to deliver verified facts based on journalistic standards.
> However, in order to create media hypes, news media are not even necessarily needed
> anymore, as examples of accidental media hypes show. In these cases, they are
> important in terms of picking up social media topics and then investigating, validating,
> and presenting them, also as part of the hype cycle. Moreover, future media hypes are
> increasingly likely to occur in social media" (2018, 328).

Roese still defines a need for traditional media in providing the public with truth through

traditional journalistic methods. However, she points to the fact that accidental media hypes

can arise without news reporting to explain her confidence in the rise of social media. It is

truly difficult to determine which platform is more influential in reporting the news at this

stage. Whatever the case, each argument emphasizes a co-dependency that will become

increasingly important for presidents, and all political figures for that matter, to use going

forward. In fact, the current President has already begun to revolutionize the campaign and

rhetoric through both mediums.

Trump and Mass Media

President Trump did a phenomenal job utilizing both traditional and social media throughout

his campaign and into the presidency. He has been able to use this co-dependency to

vehemently defend his image while attacking the credibility of those he identifies as threats.

Bruce Miroff explains,

> "A media feedback loop has been central to Trump's daily presidential spectacle.
> First, the president absorbs news coverage about himself and his administration,
> primarily by spending hours watching cable television shows in the early morning.
> Then he comments furiously on Twitter about what he has just seen and heard,
> generating a fresh slew of media stories. The loop continues with another round of
> Trump tweets" (2018, 249).

As Miroff states, this feedback loop has been integral to President Trump's everyday routine.

A more refined look further displays this point. In a study analyzing how the President

tweeted based on his campaign goals (e.g., to attract a certain type of audience), Isobelle

Clarke and Jack Grieve discovered that, not only was the President able to find a balance

between attacking and promoting himself along the campaign trail, but, in the few weeks

leading up to the election, he ran a much more positive Twitter campaign than his opposition,

Hillary Clinton (2019, 21). This may seem strange at first. However, Clarke and Grieve

explain that Trump understood that media outlets focused heavily on his more negative and

critical Tweets so, leading up to the campaign, he changed his style in order to curb any

negative coverage that he may receive going into election day. The President, however, has

not just developed these skills during his campaign. he has refined them through a long

history of promoting himself. Marjorie Hershey explains, "For decades before his 2016 presidential run, Trump had a close but ambivalent relationship with journalists. As the owner of his family's large real estate development company, he aimed to create a brand…" (2018, 258). The President went through all means possible in order to do this including developing close relationships with reporters, planting stories, hosting a reality TV show, and even pretending to be a public relations staffer for himself in order to influence his coverage (2017, Thrush and Grynbaum). Thus, the President has had a long-standing relationship with mass media and has had thorough experience influencing them in order to promote himself. In fact, in her study, Hershey quotes the *Times's* Executive Editor Dean Baquet, referencing Trump as, "This is a guy who also lives and has died on occasion – by the press…" (2018, 259). Indeed, Trump had such a great understanding of the press that he utilized tweets filled with drama and conflict that, as a result, have often been, and continue to be, amplified by the mainstream press because they tie in directly with Hershey's definition of what journalists want to report on. Thus, it is interesting to see how the relationship between the President and mass media has become far more complicated since Trump's candidacy and eventual election.

Matthew Continetti, in his article "Donald Trump, Media Darling" (citation) portrays the souring of the relationship between President Trump and the mainstream media. Contnetti explains that, in 2015, then candidate Trump dominated news outlet and received relatively positive coverage that focused on his being an underdog. For example, Susan Milligan wrote in *US News and World Report* about Trump sustaining leads in the Republican primary polls, as well as in the early contest states of New Hampshire and Iowa. Nonetheless, she, as well as others, were still relatively skeptical of his capability to win the nomination (Milligan,

2015). This coincides with Continetti's argument as he explains that, in 2015, only 12% of the coverage of Trump was dedicated to his policy proposals and ideology and only 6% covered his personal qualities. The overwhelming majority of coverage, Continetti states, was focused on the fact that Trump was gaining ground (a type of coverage known as horserace coverage), stories he argues, helped Republicans become more open to supporting him (2016, 55). Upon gaining the nomination, Continetti explains, media coverage began to shift. Stories on Trump focused less on the underdog candidate and more on scrutinizing Trump's policies, character, and prior actions along the campaign trail. Continetti explains that such a shift is natural as it is important to understand the candidate in whole before voting for them (2016, 55).

Nonetheless, this point marks the shift in attitudes that the President and many media outlets had with each other. While President Trump has always been critical of mass media in some form or another, he truly began expressing extreme criticism after the nomination. Lara Elrich references former Boston University Dean of Communications Tom Fiedler, stating that, as President, Trump is attempting to weaponize fake news in order to discredit traditional news outlets and claim more presidential power (Elrich, 2018). By discrediting certain news organizations through attacks, President Trump can claim more power in an unchecked fashion as news that contradicts him will be dismissed as fake or not truthful. Such attacks are epitomized through actions such as Trump and the White House banning CNN reporter Jim Acosta after the two argued about a migrant caravan during a press conference (*White House Bans CNN Reporter...*). While such behavior can be considered concerning as the discrediting of media reports could lead to less transparency, it aligns with a sense of distrust

of media outlets that has built up within and has been exploited by the Republican Party for

many decades (Elrich, 2018).

What is far more concerning, though, is the lengths to which Trump supporters are now

willing to go to discredit those media outlets and journalists that report negatively on the

administration. Recently, a loose network of conservatives has rallied together to uncover

sensitive and threatening information about journalists who are deemed hostile to the

president. For example,

> "The operation's tactics were on display last week, seemingly in response to two
> pieces in The Times that angered Mr. Trump's allies. The paper's editorial
> board published an editorial on Wednesday accusing Mr. Trump of fomenting anti-
> Semitism, and the newsroom published a profile on Thursday morning of Ms.
> Grisham, the new White House press secretary, which included unflattering details
> about her employment history. One person involved in the effort said the pro-Trump
> forces, aware ahead of time about the coverage of Ms. Grisham, were prepared to
> respond. Early Thursday morning, soon after the profile appeared online, Breitbart
> News published an article that documented anti-Semitic and racist tweets written a
> decade ago by Tom Wright-Piersanti, who was in college at the time and has since
> become an editor on the Times' politics desk" (Vogel and Peters, 2019).

President Trump's supporters have been so moved by his rhetoric against mass media and the

threat to his image that they are willing to uncover potentially fire-able offenses from

journalists who oppose him. While this may not have been the direct goal of the President, in

fact he has claimed that he is in no way affiliated with those in the operation, it goes to show

that he has appealed greatly to his base.

What exactly makes President Trump so appealing to so many Americans? Arlie Russel

Hochschild attempts to describe this through a sociologic perspective. She identifies Trump's

supporters as mostly white conservatives of the working and middle class, more specifically, identifying them as Tea Party advocates that rose from modest family conditions to be relatively successful (2016, 685). Through the lens of cognitive linguist George Lakoff, Hochschild explains Trump's appeal through based on how his supporters think through metaphors. After spending time and conducting countless interviews with Trump supporters, Hochschild developed what she calls a "Deep Story" or a metaphor-based story that corresponds with the emotions of her interviewees. The story she was able to develop, and which her interviewees agreed with, was one of a forgotten population which has felt left behind for the past eight years by the prior administration. She attempts to explain this Deep Story through a religious perspective that most Trump supporters believe in: the "rapture" or second coming in which non-believers are purged while the world comes to an end. Hochschild likens this "world ending" to the end of well-paid, unionized, blue and white collared jobs. She further explains that the shrinking population of whites means that the demographic world of Trump supporters is approaching an end as well (2016, 687). While such an explanation of the appeal may not make sense to those of the evangelical faith to which many Trump supporters are devoted, Hochschild explains that it is possible that Trump supporters are comparing him to as an "Old-Testament style supreme judge" who decides on the fate of his followers and opposition, giving them the treatment they felt has been stripped from them.

For those that don't buy into such an explanation, Hochschild's work still presents some value. Her deep story aligns with other studies that have examined the president's wide appeal. For example, Ralph Schroeder (year) investigated the Populist movement that is

occurring across the world. He explains that Populism is focused on excluding those that aren't part for "the people" (or, essentially, those that have been forgotten) from citizenship of a nation. This extends far beyond anti-immigration and, in the case of conservative Populists, includes the government elite, which includes those within the Republican party. In his study he found that, in Populist fashion, Trump supporters have felt left out by mass media and party elites and are looking to have their voice better represented (2018, 65). Through Twitter and the subsequent amplification of those Tweets in mainstream media, the President has been able to do just this and give Populists of the U.S. a wide audience for their voice to be heard and which they hope, will give them better representation so as not to be forgotten again. Whether it be to this group of supporters, other, less marginalized, Trump supporters, or to the American public, the President has been very effective at communicating policies and an image at a large scale. While the responses by the American people have been mixed, President Trump's ability to attract a major following through Twitter and his media presence suggests that strategic use of social media in order to gain media exposure may be effective for politicians in the future.

METHODOLOGY

Cases Used for Study

This research focuses on nine major "events" or cases that have taken place throughout the Trump presidency. These events ranged from major policy proposals to responses to major crises, including impeachment proceedings. Despite the wide range of characteristics of each event, each of the nine events met a common set of criteria that aided in the attempt to study the relationship between public approval and a president's interaction with different types of

media (e.g., press, radio, TV, and social media). The criteria used to evaluate whether each event should be included was relatively simple and straight-forward. First, and foremost, it was necessary to make sure that the event was one in which the President would be interacting in some form with mass media, either directly in an interview or press conference, or indirectly, through tweets that subsequently got broadcast by a media outlet or were directly targeted at a specific outlet. In most cases I preferred to pick events that had both aspects involved. For example, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, which, unfortunately, was unable to be involved in this study due to time restraints, President Trump made nightly appearances on television and has had many of his tweets reported on by media outlets across the globe. In order to study the impact of presidential communication with and through media, it is important that cases are chosen based on if the President has some form of intentional interaction with media outlets. The other major criterion focused on the circulation of each story. Thus, for each event it confirmed that the story was well-circulated throughout major media outlets. For example, while President Trump certainly endorsed candidates in the congressional election in 2018, the volume of news reports on the subject, especially those that related to President Trump, were relatively low when compared to other events in the Trump presidency. Thus, while an important event in terms of American politics and partisan influence, the congressional elections in 2018 did not create enough media attention around the President and, for the purpose of this study, wasn't very relevant.

Below is a list of each case used for the study accompanied by a brief description and explanation to warrant its inclusion:

1. <u>Travel Ban</u>: In January of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order placing restrictions on travel into the United States from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The order received plenty of negative press coverage with many arguing that it targeted predominantly Muslim nations. President Trump ardently defended the order on Twitter which also resulted in a lot of press coverage and he also attempted to discredit outlets such as the *New York Times*. This made the travel ban an ideal case to study as there was a great amount of interaction between the President and mass media that could potentially impact Trump's public approval numbers.

2. <u>Hurricane Maria</u>: As a disastrous hurricane struck Puerto Rico in September of 2017, President Trump was tested with his first natural disaster while in office. In order to promote his narrative of success, President Trump bragged about the low death rates in Puerto Rico to journalists and tweeted about how great of a job he was doing. In response to fact checking by certain outlets that showed the President's claims weren't entirely true or masked other issues that he wasn't dealing with effectively in the region, President Trump responded by calling them fake news and releasing videos of workers in the region to emphasize that he was making progress. Similar back and forth interactions occurred for about a month, making this case ideal to add to this study.

3. <u>Tax Law</u>: December 22, 2017, marked a major victory for President Trump as he was able to keep one of his campaign promises with the passing of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. Such a sweeping overhaul of the tax code naturally received plenty of news coverage and analysis and the President celebrated its passage heavily on

Twitter. Not only did the President tout his success, he also claimed that he deserved

credit from media outlets. Furthermore, the President attempted to popularize the Act

at a rally on Wednesday, November 29th, 2017. While not directly speaking to media,

Trump's words and actions at such rallies are often reported on by major media

outlets, still allowing the president to attempt to manipulate his image to the public.

4. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: On June 1, 2018, the Trump administration announced

   that it would be expanding steel and aluminum tariffs to the European Union, Canada,

   and Mexico. The President defended these tariffs on Twitter, targeting the *Wall Street

   Journal* for refusing to report on the supposed benefits that the tariffs were bringing to

   the U.S. The original tariffs were mentioned in March of 2018, when Trump made an

   apparently impromptu announcement that many outlets cut into other programs to

   report as breaking news. In this announcement the President made sure to craft his

   image by comparing this "success" to the "failures" of other presidents, stating that the

   presidents that had agreed to earlier "unfair" trade deals should be ashamed of

   themselves. While there was no real back and forth between the President and media,

   Trump clearly attempted to craft an image in the announcement and continued to

   defend himself on Twitter throughout the month of May, making this case one of

   interest for this study.

5. Meeting with Kim Jong-Un: In June of 2018, the President had a historic meeting with

   Kim Jong-Un, leader of North Korea. This was a highly publicized event with many

   major media outlets in attendance. After the meeting, the President did an interview

   with ABC News that was further reported on and publicized by other outlets, in which

   he criticized the Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal and stated that the North

Korean deal would be far stricter. A week after the meeting, Trump criticized the fake news for misreporting the success of the meeting. Given the historical significance of the event and subsequent press coverage and response from the President on Twitter as a result, it was determined that this would be an important case to analyze.

6. Government Shutdown: The end of 2018 and beginning of 2019 was marred by a heavily partisan battle centered around funding for a border wall along the U.S. and Mexico border. This led to the longest government shutdown in history. In press conferences in the White House Rose Garden, President Trump proudly stated that he was proud of what he was doing with the shutdown and, when being asked questions by reporters, frequently interjected with comments such as "Here we go again" to display his displeasure. On Twitter, the president ardently defended his position and constantly made attacks at Democratic leaders stating that he was waiting on them to make the deal. These tweets were heavily reported on by many news agencies. Furthermore, the President tweeted at news outlets such as MSNBC, supporting them, as they ran stories about the dangers of the lack of border security. President Trump's almost constant interaction with media outlets during this period made it a very powerful case to be analyzed for this study.

7. Jim Acosta Incident: After a heated exchange with CNN's White House Correspondent, Jim Acosta, President Trump, and his administration revoked Acosta's White House press pass. This sent waves amongst media outlets and even birthed a lawsuit with CNN suing the White House as a result. Acosta's press pass was returned about two weeks later. However, this incident put on display the President's unorthodox approach to dealing with media. Naturally, this event was reported on by

CNN, as well as many other news outlets. Unfortunately, President Trump didn't

Tweet much about the incident, however, just prior to it, he tweeted angrily at CNN

which may have sparked such a harsh reaction. While there was a lack of tweets

regarding the issue, this case involves a direct lash at a specific media outlet so it was

determined that it should be included.

8. Impeachment: President Trump's impeachment proceedings were another instance of

frequent interaction with media sources. Throughout the several months of the

impeachment process and subsequent acquittal, President Trump made several

appearances on television in which he publicly denounced the process as unfair.

Before departing to Atlanta to drum up support for his reelection campaign in

November of 2019, President Trump confidently stated that he wasn't worried

whatsoever about the impeachment process to a group of journalists. On Twitter, the

President constantly attacked the allegations attempting to discredit them and

frequently posted videos from news outlets that also denounced the impeachment,

such as Fox News, while attacking other news outlets that were not as friendly. This

presented an environment in which the President was constantly interacting with

media in order to attempt to discredit the impeachment hearings and convey himself as

innocent, making it valuable for this study.

9. Iran Strike: On January 3, 2020, President Trump ordered a missile strike that killed

Qasem Soleimani near Baghdad International Airport. The President made many

appearances on television to discuss the attack and subsequent response by Iran. He

also, however, proclaimed at rallies that were held afterward that there was good

reason for the attack, as he asserted that Soleimani was planning imminent attacks on

Americans and American interests in the Middle East. He further defended himself on

Twitter, criticizing the "Fake News" for trying to determine whether said attacks truly

were imminent. The President also made several other statements and tweets

defending his position that were reported on by major media outlets.

Data Collection

The public approval data used for analysis mostly came from two polls: The Morning Consult

and Civiqs, although some analysis used national level polling from FiveThirtyEight to

compare to prior presidents. Each of these polls provided clear dashboards that could be

filtered by state and consistently tracked the President's public approval numbers over time,

with margins of error of about 5% for each state. Unfortunately, however, each poll reported

on different timelines. Civiqs reported public approval numbers for the President at intervals

of every two days while the Morning Consult reported its data each month. Thus, while it

would have been ideal to observe the more immediate impacts that President Trump's

dealings with media could have had on his public approval ratings, in order to maintain a

consistent unit of measure, changes in public approval numbers were analyzed on a month to

month basis for both polls. Thus, after identifying a specific event, data was collected and

recorded in Microsoft Excel for the day and month that the event occurred and exactly one

month later. The data for the two polls in the month of and month later were then averaged

(so as not to rely on one poll over the other) and the difference between these two averages

was calculated and used to represent the President's change in public approval for the month.

After all states were analyzed in a similar fashion for each of the nine events, a set of

summary statistics was produced for the changes observed for each state. These statistics

included minimum, maximum, mean, median, and standard deviation across the nine changes that were calculated for each state.

RESULTS

The overall results for each state were relatively underwhelming in terms of identifying any significant positive or negative trends. In fact, President Trump's approval ratings were remarkably stable at a state by state basis and, consequently, at a national level as well. Across all states there was never an event that was associated with anything greater than a change of 3% in overall approval in either direction. This, however, varied by case. In response to the travel ban, President Trump saw a high of 2.5% increase in overall approval in the state of Nevada and a maximum of a 3% decline in approval in the states of Connecticut and Vermont (See Appendix A). During his Hurricane Maria Response, the maximum gain that the President saw in approval was 2.5% in Wyoming while he saw approval decline in both Idaho and New Mexico by 2.5% (See Appendix B). In response to the passing of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, President Trump saw three states tied for highest increases in opinion with 3% gains in Georgia, New Hampshire, and Utah while he lost the most approval in two states (Hawaii and Vermont) by just 1.5% (See Appendix C). In response to the Steel and Aluminum Tariffs, President Trump only experienced two states with opinions that changed by over 2% in a month. In Maine, the president became more popular while in Tennessee, he became less popular (See Appendix D). The Kim Jong-Un meeting that Trump participated in resulted in the smallest swings in public opinion for President Trump with two states (West Virginia and Wyoming) tied for highest growth in approval of the President by 1.5% and four states (Iowa, Maine, Michigan, and Rhode Island) tied and reported declines in approval by

the same margin of 1.5% (See Appendix E). During the government shutdown, President

Trump saw a maximum increase in approval across all states of 2% in Idaho while

experienced a maximum 2% decline in New Hampshire (See Appendix F). The President's

handling of his disagreement with reporter Jim Acosta appeared to be relatively unpopular

with the American public. President Trump saw a high of only .5% increase in overall

approval in the state of New Hampshire while he also experienced a maximum of a 3%

decline, matching the highest decline in approval among all events, in Louisiana (See

Appendix G). During President Trump's impeachment proceedings, he saw five states tied

for maximum increase in approval of 1.5% (Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, South Carolina, and

Texas). Wyoming saw the largest decline in approval with a 2.5% drop (See Appendix H).

Finally, after the drone strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, the President experienced a

maximum increase of 1.5% in approval in Hawaii. In contrast, the only state saw opinion

drop by greater than a percent was Vermont with a drop in approval of 2% (See Appendix I).

Nonetheless, in all states, the maximum average change across all nine events topped out at

1.06%. This took place in Vermont and it was a decline in public approval (See Appendix J).

The low average change across all events suggests that the higher values were in response to

one or two events rather than contributing to a trend. For example, of the 12 largest declines

that President Trump saw (2.5-3% declines), six of them (for the states of Louisiana,

Tennessee, Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, and Montana) were associated with his

administration revoking Jim Acosta's White House press pass (See Appendix J). This

suggests that the public may have seen the Trump administration's actions as going too far for

this specific event. Given that President Trump had relatively little exposure to the press,

outside of his original altercation with Acosta, relative to some of the other cases, it originally seemed to suggest that the lack of press coverage and interactions with media outlets harmed the president. Analysis of the other six sharpest declines (associated with Vermont, Connecticut, Utah, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Idaho) that he experienced dispelled this however, as they took place during cases in which the President had far more media exposure. These events were the introduction of the travel ban, President Trump's impeachment proceedings, and Hurricane Maria (See Appendix J).

Regarding the largest increases in President Trump's public approval over the period of a month, President Trump saw five of his seven biggest gains (gains of 2.5-3%) in the states of Louisiana, Tennessee, Utah, New Hampshire, Georgia, and Kansas during his passing of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The other two largest gains that he experienced, in Wyoming and Nevada, took place during the President's Hurricane Maria efforts and travel ban, respectively. Once again, given that most of his largest gains were experienced during one event, it appears that rises in public approval were more a result of support for the policy rather than the President's media presence (See Appendix J).

The centrality of President Trump's largest gains in public approval around one event is reflected by the fact that the President was not nearly as successful in situations in which he had similar media exposure. To reiterate, however, even a 3% change over a month is to be considered extremely stable when comparing to the most recent presidents. For example, at the national level, President Obama, who started out with high approval but slowly declined until stabilizing about one year in, saw spikes as large as 5% in his public approval numbers.

President George W. Bush saw two spikes of over 15% in the span of a month (although one was likely a result of the rally 'round the flag effect from 9/11) and President Clinton saw many changes of more than 5%, several of which neared 10% changes. Finally, President Reagan, who President Trump seems to idolize in some respect based off his tweets referencing the former President, experienced a drop of overall public approval of over 15% in the span of a month (Silver, Bycoffe & Mehta, 2020). President Trump has not experienced anything quite as drastic as any of these former presidents. Thus, while no significant spikes or changes were found in public approval, an unprecedented stability in public approval was, instead, highlighted.

One small, but certainly odd, trend that was discovered at the state, and therefore national level as well, regarded the President's public approval during his impeachment proceedings. While the two other recent presidents to be impeached (President Nixon and President Clinton) both saw relatively sharp declines in public approval over time, President Trump's approval increased during his impeachment. While experiencing an initial decline of about one percent at the national level immediately following his impeachment, President Trump saw his public approval amongst likely voters rise from a low of about 42.8% in December to a high of 45.2% in February when he was acquitted by the Senate. While the almost 2.5% increase in overall public approval is not necessarily a drastic spike, it is inconsistent with the experiences of President Nixon and President Clinton. For example, according to a Pew Research Center, President Nixon saw a decline from 68% approval in January of 1973 to 48% in April as more Americans began to hear about the Watergate scandal (Kohut, 2019). As time progressed, Nixon saw his public approval numbers continue to decline until reaching

a measly 24% at the time of his resignation. President Clinton saw a similar negative trend, yet not nearly as extreme. After the House approved two articles of impeachment against President Clinton, his public approval numbers took a sharp decline from 71% approval to 63%, a point at which they never fully recovered to pre-impeachment levels, even after rejection of the articles of impeachment by the Senate (DeSilver, 2019). This is certainly an odd trend in the President's public approval numbers however, it likely can't be explained wholly in terms of media exposure, as both Presidents Nixon and Clinton likely had equally as much exposure on television, in newspapers, and over the radio during their impeachment proceedings. Perhaps President Trump's ability to communicate with his followers on Twitter, a website that did not exist during the times of Presidents Nixon and Clinton, may have had a significant impact on his ability to maintain and make gains in public approval throughout the process of impeachment. However, more research would be necessary in order to definitively come to this conclusion.

LIMITATIONS

The Measure of Public Approval

While public approval polls are certainly a valid measure for measuring the public's approval of the president, they are not necessarily the most accurate. This lack of accuracy is best exemplified in 2016 prior to the presidential election when most polls had Hillary Clinton winning. There are several reasons that contribute to polls lacking more desirable accuracy. One reason is a lack of consistency. For example, as the internet and social media have brought more biased reporting littered with falsified information, readers could change their perspective on the President. Thus, misinformed individuals could frequently change their answers regarding approval of the president based off the news stories they have read

recently, regardless of how true they are. Therefore, the lack of accuracy in the news is reflected in accuracy of the poll. Furthermore, bias can be embedded into the polls themselves. For example, a media source or polling agency that is more friendly to the President may alter its sampling in a fashion that will likely produce a higher approval rating, while an outlet or polling agency that is against President Trump may do the opposite. Finally, the sheer fact that polls create different results in general emphasizes the lack of accuracy as, if the method were perfectly accurate, all polls would produce the same results.

<u>Limited Polling Data</u>
As the study progressed, it became abundantly clear that there was very limited polling data that displayed results for each state over a period. While certain polls did analyze state public approval at a specific point in time, the Morning Consult and Civiqs were the only two polling agencies that consistently tracked President Trump's approval by state and over time. This limited the ability to generate more accurate results throughout the study. Ideally several polls would have been used and their results averaged to adjust for any sampling errors. Unfortunately, however, only two polls were available, meaning that the study was far more prone to any errors in the data. Thus, it is possible that the study could have been impacted by the biases of the polling agencies. Also, the lack of polling data limited the measuring of results monthly. It would have been interesting to analyze changes in public approval on a more frequent basis. However, given that the Morning Consult measured public approval monthly, measuring in any shorter time span would have caused sole reliance on the Civiqs poll, making the study far less accurate. Thus, a one-month timeline was used for both polls to stay consistent.

Overlap of Events

Given the measurement of public approval monthly and the fact that President Trump has only been in office for about three and a half years, there were certain instances in which the months that events took place overlapped. This provided a real issue for the study as it was unclear whether a change in public approval could be attributed to one event or the other. This posed a very prominent issue because it opened the possibility of one event resulting in negative public approval while another event within the same time frame resulting in a relatively equal positive change in public approval. When observing the data monthly, the two events could overlap and result in a net zero change in public approval. However, if it were possible to observe in a smaller timeframe, the events would not overlap, and one could better isolate each. Had different polling data been available, smaller time frames could have been used. Furthermore, had the President been in office for longer when the study was conducted, there would have been more freedom to choose cases that were spread enough to prevent overlap. While this limitation did not plague the study, it did occur once (the steel and aluminum tariffs and Kim Jong-Un summit all occurred within the same three months meaning there was an overlap in data for June). Also, it is important to note that other events that were not included in this study could have potentially impacted public approval for events that were included if they occurred within the time range of a selected case.

Separating the Event from Media Coverage

Another inherent flaw with the methodology of this study was the inability to truly separate the public's opinion of the president's media interactions with the event or policy itself. For example, President George W. Bush's approval skyrocketed after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. While some of this may have had to do with Bush's appearance at Ground Zero several days

after the attack, President Bush would have still likely saw a steep increase in public approval as a result of the rally 'round the flag effect (the phenomenon of increased public approval of the president during times of crisis). This begs the question of which had more of an impact on President Bush's public approval, the attack itself or his media presence afterward. Unfortunately, there was not, and still is not, a specified measure to decipher this. Thus, it is difficult to make any concrete conclusions about President Trump and whether his actual policy or participation in events drove public approval or if it was his constant interaction with media outlets while trying to promote himself in response to said policy and events. Perhaps, in the future if this study were to be recreated, a carefully questioned poll could be crafted in order to determine what drives how popular the president is among the public.

Partisanship

Partisanship was a limitation to finding any changes in public approval that media exposure and interaction may have had on the president. It also helps to explain the incredibly stable public approval numbers that he experienced. The following chart produced by the Morning Consult helps display just how important of a factor

https://morningconsult.com/tracking-trump-2/

partisanship was in the Presidents relatively unchanging public approval numbers. This chart shows President Trump's approval by Republican primary voters by age demographic. It becomes abundantly apparent that President Trump is extremely popular within the Republican party. Among all Republican primary voters surveyed, 89% approve of the President. This unwavering support is further compounded by the highly partisan

environment that American politics currently finds itself in. Given the viciousness with which each party views the opposite, many Republicans and Democrats alike have found themselves throwing their unwavering support behind their respective candidates. It appears that this is certainly happening with President Trump as well. Thus, many supporters may ardently support Trump, despite disagreeing with some of his actions, to ensure that a Democratic candidate does not win an election. This helps produce very stable public approval rating, making it difficult to find any large changes that could have been a result of media presence and communication.

CONCLUSIONS

Public Indifference & Media Feedback Loop
President Trump's relatively unchanging public approval numbers helped display that, at least in the current political climate, the public is indifferent when it comes to how the President interacts with and appears in media. Had there been any major positive or negative spikes in public approval, it may have been possible to correlate it to media presence. However, it appears that public approval is more driven by partisanship (as evidenced prior by the high popularity in the Republican party) than it is by media relations. Nonetheless, a President's continued presence in media is surely still important in swaying independent or indifferent voters. Mentioned prior, Bruce Miroff indicates that a media feedback loop had been central to President Trump's campaign in 2016. Trump, in response to reports about himself, constantly fired off newsworthy and emotion eliciting tweets that prompted reporting from many major news outlets. Upon these new reports, Trump was able to fire off a new round of tweets that continued the loop. In doing so, President Trump was able to continuously keep himself in the news. Compared to his opponent, Hillary Clinton, Trump dominated the

Twitter scene and was far better at generating news about himself in order to create the publicity required in order to eventually defeat Clinton.

While it appears that this media feedback loop does not necessarily impact public approval, it is important in generating the publicity that candidates need to be successful. Given the success that the current President has had in generating that publicity, it is likely that the media feedback loop will become increasingly important in politics in the future. Come election time, this feedback loop will become even important. Principles in psychology such as priming (the idea that once an idea is brought to your attention, it impacts the way you think for some time) could sway indifferent voters to vote for the candidate that they last had exposure to. This could have a major impact on elections going forward. Furthermore, it is evident that many politicians have begun to acknowledge the importance of the media feedback loop. While few, if any, have adopted the Trump-esque Twitter style, we are beginning to see many more politicians attempting to develop a presence on different forms of social media, mainly Twitter, through which they can harness the power of the media feedback loop.

Trump's Reelction?
One of the major goals of this study was to be able to identify how President Trump may fare in a reelection bid as a result of his media strategy. Unfortunately, the data used in this study produced very inconclusive results on this question. President Trump's popularity among the public has remained around the same level for most of his presidency at a national level. This was consistent at the state level as well. Furthermore, for most states, the President's public approval rating ranged somewhere between 40 and 50%. Given these numbers it is

essentially impossible to make a prediction since it is so close to an even split. With the introduction of independent and indifferent voters who will likely make their choice based off who the Democratic candidate is, public approval for President Trump could move toward 50%, indicating that he may win that state, or it may remain well below 50%, indicating that he may lose the state. Furthermore, the introduction of a third-party candidate could potentially impact votes for the incumbent President as well as the inclusion of a third party candidate could allow states to be won with less than 50% of the vote. The impact of this, however, is difficult to analyze given the data used for the study. Thus, since it appears that that most states do not especially approve or disapprove of the President, it would be irresponsible to make a prediction backed by the data and analysis from this study.

It's Complicated: President Trump's Relationship with the Media
Honors Thesis for Joseph Iamele

APPENDICES

Appendix A – Data on Travel Ban

	Morning Consu January, 2017	Civiqs 25-Jan	Avg	Difference		Morning Consu February, 2017	Civiqs 26-Feb	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
Alabama	0.62	0.56	0.59	0.06		0.65	0.56	0.605	0.09		-0.03	0	0.015
Alaska	0.55	0.5	0.525	0.05		0.6	0.49	0.545	0.11		-0.05	0.01	0.02
Arizona	0.55	0.45	0.5	0.1		0.54	0.44	0.49	0.1		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Arkansas	0.59	0.57	0.58	0.02		0.59	0.56	0.575	0.03		0	0.01	-0.005
California	0.42	0.3	0.36	0.12	27	0.43	0.27	0.35	0.16	34	-0.01	0.03	-0.01
Colorado	0.45	0.39	0.42	0.06		0.46	0.39	0.425	0.07		-0.01	0	0.005
Connecticut	0.47	0.36	0.415	0.11		0.43	0.34	0.385	0.09		0.04	0.02	**-0.03**
Delaware	0.49	0.38	0.435	0.11		0.48	0.36	0.42	0.12		0.01	0.02	-0.015
Florida	0.56	0.45	0.505	0.11		0.56	0.44	0.5	0.12		0	0.01	-0.005
Georgia	0.53	0.46	0.495	0.07		0.54	0.45	0.495	0.09		-0.01	0.01	0
Hawaii	0.38	0.3	0.34	0.08		0.4	0.3	0.35	0.1		-0.02	0	0.01
Idaho	0.59	0.59	0.59	0		0.61	0.58	0.595	0.03		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Illinois	0.49	0.36	0.425	0.13		0.47	0.34	0.405	0.13		0.02	0.02	-0.02
Indiana	0.55	0.53	0.54	0.02		0.54	0.51	0.525	0.03		0.01	0.02	-0.015
Iowa	0.49	0.48	0.485	0.01		0.49	0.46	0.475	0.03		0	0.02	-0.01
Kansas	0.56	0.53	0.545	0.03		0.56	0.52	0.54	0.04		0	0.01	-0.005
Kentucky	0.61	0.57	0.59	0.04		0.61	0.56	0.585	0.05		0	0.01	-0.005
Louisiana	0.59	0.51	0.55	0.08		0.62	0.52	0.57	0.1		-0.03	-0.01	0.02
Maine	0.48	0.43	0.455	0.05		0.5	0.42	0.46	0.08		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Maryland	0.38	0.31	0.345	0.07		0.38	0.3	0.34	0.08		0	0.01	-0.005
Massachusetts	0.43	0.3	0.365	0.13		0.42	0.28	0.35	0.14		0.01	0.02	-0.015
Michigan	0.48	0.43	0.455	0.05		0.49	0.41	0.45	0.08		-0.01	0.02	-0.005
Minnesota	0.46	0.42	0.44	0.04		0.48	0.41	0.445	0.07		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Mississippi	0.61	0.51	0.56	0.1		0.61	0.51	0.56	0.1		0	0	0
Missouri	0.53	0.54	0.535	-0.01		0.58	0.52	0.55	0.06		-0.05	0.02	0.015
Montana	0.56	0.51	0.535	0.05		0.54	0.49	0.515	0.05		0.02	0.02	-0.02
Nebraska	0.56	0.53	0.545	0.03		0.55	0.51	0.53	0.04		0.01	0.02	-0.015
Nevada	0.49	0.4	0.445	0.09		0.55	0.39	0.47	0.16		-0.06	0.01	**0.025**
New Hampshire	0.45	0.41	0.43	0.04		0.45	0.4	0.425	0.05		0	0.01	-0.005
New Jersey	0.46	0.36	0.41	0.1		0.47	0.34	0.405	0.13		-0.01	0.02	-0.005
New Mexico	0.52	0.42	0.47	0.1		0.5	0.4	0.45	0.1		0.02	0.02	-0.02
New York	0.49	0.33	0.41	0.16		0.49	0.32	0.405	0.17		0	0.01	-0.005
North Carolina	0.53	0.44	0.485	0.09		0.54	0.43	0.485	0.11		-0.01	0.01	0
North Dakota	0.56	0.61	0.585	-0.05		0.55	0.62	0.585	-0.07		0.01	-0.01	0
Ohio	0.51	0.49	0.5	0.02		0.51	0.47	0.49	0.04		0	0.02	-0.01
Oklahoma	0.61	0.6	0.605	0.01		0.61	0.59	0.6	0.02		0	0.01	-0.005
Oregon	0.45	0.37	0.41	0.08		0.46	0.35	0.405	0.11		-0.01	0.02	-0.005
Pennsylvania	0.49	0.44	0.465	0.05		0.51	0.43	0.47	0.08		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Rhode Island	0.42	0.35	0.385	0.07		0.44	0.34	0.39	0.1		-0.02	0.01	0.005
South Carolina	0.56	0.5	0.53	0.06		0.59	0.5	0.545	0.09		-0.03	0	0.015
South Dakota	0.54	0.57	0.555	-0.03		0.56	0.57	0.565	-0.01		-0.02	0	0.01
Tennessee	0.61	0.53	0.57	0.08		0.59	0.53	0.56	0.06		0.02	0	-0.01
Texas	0.54	0.48	0.51	0.06		0.56	0.48	0.52	0.08		-0.02	0	0.01
Utah	0.58	0.53	0.555	0.05		0.58	0.53	0.555	0.05		0	0	0
Vermont	0.43	0.33	0.38	0.1		0.39	0.31	0.35	0.08		0.04	0.02	**-0.03**
Virginia	0.49	0.4	0.445	0.09		0.52	0.39	0.455	0.13		-0.03	0.01	0.01
Washington	0.45	0.35	0.4	0.1		0.45	0.33	0.39	0.12		0	0.02	-0.01
West Virginia	0.62	0.61	0.615	0.01		0.62	0.61	0.615	0.01		0	0	0
Wisconsin	0.47	0.45	0.46	0.02		0.47	0.44	0.455	0.03		0	0.01	-0.005
Wyoming	0.63	0.65	0.64	-0.02		0.66	0.65	0.655	0.01		-0.03	0	0.015

Appendix B – Data on Hurricane Maria

	Morning Consu	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consu	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
	September, 20'	16-Sep				October, 2017	17-Oct						
Alabama	0.59	0.57	0.58	0.02		0.6	0.57	0.585	0.03		-0.01	0	0.005
Alaska	0.52	0.49	0.505	0.03		0.54	0.5	0.52	0.04		-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Arizona	0.44	0.43	0.435	0.01		0.47	0.43	0.45	0.04		-0.03	0	0.015
Arkansas	0.54	0.57	0.555	-0.03		0.54	0.59	0.565	-0.05		0	-0.02	0.01
California	0.36	0.27	0.315	0.09	8	0.34	0.28	0.31	0.06	9	0.02	-0.01	-0.005
Colorado	0.41	0.37	0.39	0.04		0.4	0.37	0.385	0.03		0.01	0	-0.005
Connecticut	0.36	0.33	0.345	0.03		0.38	0.33	0.355	0.05		-0.02	0	0.01
Delaware	0.38	0.37	0.375	0.01		0.4	0.36	0.38	0.04		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Florida	0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		0.49	0.46	0.475	0.03		-0.01	0	0.005
Georgia	0.47	0.44	0.455	0.03		0.5	0.44	0.47	0.06		-0.03	0	0.015
Hawaii	0.31	0.26	0.285	0.05		0.31	0.27	0.29	0.04		0	-0.01	0.005
Idaho	0.55	0.58	0.565	-0.03		0.51	0.57	0.54	-0.06		0.04	0.01	-0.025
Illinois	0.37	0.31	0.34	0.06		0.38	0.31	0.345	0.07		-0.01	0	0.005
Indiana	0.5	0.5	0.5	0		0.48	0.49	0.485	-0.01		0.02	0.01	-0.015
Iowa	0.42	0.47	0.445	-0.05		0.42	0.46	0.44	-0.04		0	0.01	-0.005
Kansas	0.5	0.51	0.505	-0.01		0.5	0.52	0.51	-0.02		0	-0.01	0.005
Kentucky	0.54	0.57	0.555	-0.03		0.51	0.56	0.535	-0.05		0.03	0.01	-0.02
Louisiana	0.57	0.53	0.55	0.04		0.55	0.53	0.54	0.02		0.02	0	-0.01
Maine	0.42	0.38	0.4	0.04		0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03		0	-0.01	0.005
Maryland	0.33	0.27	0.3	0.06		0.33	0.28	0.305	0.05		0	-0.01	0.005
Massachusetts	0.32	0.27	0.295	0.05		0.32	0.26	0.29	0.06		0	0.01	-0.005
Michigan	0.4	0.41	0.405	-0.01		0.4	0.41	0.405	-0.01		0	0	0
Minnesota	0.39	0.4	0.395	-0.01		0.4	0.39	0.395	0.01		-0.01	0.01	0
Mississippi	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.02		0.55	0.53	0.54	0.02		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Missouri	0.49	0.53	0.51	-0.04		0.49	0.53	0.51	-0.04		0	0	0
Montana	0.5	0.48	0.49	0.02		0.5	0.51	0.505	-0.01		0	-0.03	0.015
Nebraska	0.5	0.51	0.505	-0.01		0.51	0.51	0.51	0		-0.01	0	0.005
Nevada	0.44	0.38	0.41	0.06		0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03		0.02	-0.01	-0.005
New Hampshir	0.38	0.38	0.38	0		0.42	0.37	0.395	0.05		-0.04	0.01	0.015
New Jersey	0.38	0.33	0.355	0.05		0.39	0.33	0.36	0.06		-0.01	0	0.005
New Mexico	0.43	0.39	0.41	0.04		0.39	0.38	0.385	0.01		0.04	0.01	-0.025
New York	0.37	0.32	0.345	0.05		0.36	0.32	0.34	0.04		0.01	0	-0.005
North Carolina	0.47	0.43	0.45	0.04		0.45	0.43	0.44	0.02		0.02	0	-0.01
North Dakota	0.51	0.63	0.57	-0.12		0.51	0.62	0.565	-0.11		0	0.01	-0.005
Ohio	0.46	0.46	0.46	0		0.44	0.46	0.45	-0.02		0.02	0	-0.01
Oklahoma	0.56	0.6	0.58	-0.04		0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05		0.01	0	-0.005
Oregon	0.39	0.33	0.36	0.06		0.37	0.33	0.35	0.04		0.02	0	-0.01
Pennsylvania	0.45	0.43	0.44	0.02		0.44	0.42	0.43	0.02		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Rhode Island	0.35	0.33	0.34	0.02		0.35	0.33	0.34	0.02		0	0	0
South Carolina	0.51	0.5	0.505	0.01		0.52	0.51	0.515	0.01		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
South Dakota	0.51	0.56	0.535	-0.05		0.52	0.57	0.545	-0.05		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Tennessee	0.53	0.53	0.53	0		0.53	0.53	0.53	0		0	0	0
Texas	0.51	0.47	0.49	0.04		0.48	0.47	0.475	0.01		0.03	0	-0.015
Utah	0.52	0.49	0.505	0.03		0.48	0.48	0.48	0		0.04	0.01	-0.025
Vermont	0.33	0.26	0.295	0.07		0.32	0.25	0.285	0.07		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Virginia	0.42	0.38	0.4	0.04		0.45	0.39	0.42	0.06		-0.03	-0.01	0.02
Washington	0.37	0.31	0.34	0.06		0.34	0.3	0.32	0.04		0.03	0.01	-0.02
West Virginia	0.59	0.61	0.6	-0.02		0.61	0.61	0.61	0		-0.02	0	0.01
Wisconsin	0.41	0.43	0.42	-0.02		0.4	0.44	0.42	-0.04		0.01	-0.01	0
Wyoming	0.6	0.65	0.625	-0.05		0.65	0.65	0.65	0		-0.05	0	0.025

Appendix C – Data on Tax Law

	Morning Consu December, 2017	Civiqs 22-Dec	Avg	Difference		Morning Consu January, 2018	Civiqs 23-Jan	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
Alabama	0.6	0.57	0.585	0.03		0.63	0.58	0.605	0.05		-0.03	-0.01	0.02
Alaska	0.51	0.5	0.505	0.01		0.48	0.52	0.5	-0.04		0.03	-0.02	-0.005
Arizona	0.47	0.45	0.46	0.02		0.46	0.47	0.465	-0.01		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Arkansas	0.53	0.58	0.555	-0.05		0.53	0.6	0.565	-0.07		0	-0.02	0.01
California	0.35	0.28	0.315	0.07	11	0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07	11	-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Colorado	0.42	0.37	0.395	0.05		0.41	0.38	0.395	0.03		0.01	-0.01	0
Connecticut	0.37	0.34	0.355	0.03		0.39	0.36	0.375	0.03		-0.02	-0.02	0.02
Delaware	0.4	0.39	0.395	0.01		0.41	0.4	0.405	0.01		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Florida	0.49	0.46	0.475	0.03		0.5	0.48	0.49	0.02		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
Georgia	0.47	0.44	0.455	0.03		0.51	0.46	0.485	0.05		-0.04	-0.02	**0.03**
Hawaii	0.33	0.27	0.3	0.06		0.3	0.27	0.285	0.03		0.03	0	**-0.015**
Idaho	0.51	0.58	0.545	-0.07		0.53	0.59	0.56	-0.06		-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Illinois	0.36	0.32	0.34	0.04		0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02		-0.01	-0.03	0.02
Indiana	0.49	0.49	0.49	0		0.48	0.51	0.495	-0.03		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Iowa	0.42	0.47	0.445	-0.05		0.43	0.47	0.45	-0.04		-0.01	0	0.005
Kansas	0.47	0.51	0.49	-0.04		0.5	0.53	0.515	-0.03		-0.03	-0.02	0.025
Kentucky	0.53	0.57	0.55	-0.04		0.55	0.58	0.565	-0.03		-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Louisiana	0.53	0.53	0.53	0		0.57	0.54	0.555	0.03		-0.04	-0.01	0.025
Maine	0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03		0.4	0.41	0.405	-0.01		0.02	-0.02	0
Maryland	0.35	0.29	0.32	0.06		0.36	0.3	0.33	0.06		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Massachusetts	0.32	0.26	0.29	0.06		0.32	0.28	0.3	0.04		0	-0.02	0.01
Michigan	0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0.42	0.42	0.42	0		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Minnesota	0.38	0.4	0.39	-0.02		0.41	0.41	0.41	0		-0.03	-0.01	0.02
Mississippi	0.55	0.53	0.54	0.02		0.56	0.54	0.55	0.02		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Missouri	0.49	0.53	0.51	-0.04		0.49	0.55	0.52	-0.06		0	-0.02	0.01
Montana	0.49	0.51	0.5	-0.02		0.48	0.52	0.5	-0.04		0.01	-0.01	0
Nebraska	0.49	0.52	0.505	-0.03		0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02		-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Nevada	0.44	0.4	0.42	0.04		0.47	0.41	0.44	0.06		-0.03	-0.01	0.02
New Hampshire	0.4	0.36	0.38	0.04		0.43	0.39	0.41	0.04		-0.03	-0.03	**0.03**
New Jersey	0.39	0.33	0.36	0.06		0.4	0.35	0.375	0.05		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
New Mexico	0.4	0.38	0.39	0.02		0.38	0.41	0.395	-0.03		0.02	-0.03	0.005
New York	0.38	0.33	0.355	0.05		0.39	0.35	0.37	0.04		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
North Carolina	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.02		0.47	0.45	0.46	0.02		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
North Dakota	0.51	0.66	0.585	-0.15		0.53	0.67	0.6	-0.14		-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Ohio	0.44	0.46	0.45	-0.02		0.46	0.47	0.465	-0.01		-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Oklahoma	0.54	0.6	0.57	-0.06		0.55	0.63	0.59	-0.08		-0.01	-0.03	0.02
Oregon	0.37	0.34	0.355	0.03		0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02		0	-0.01	0.005
Pennsylvania	0.45	0.42	0.435	0.03		0.46	0.43	0.445	0.03		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Rhode Island	0.36	0.33	0.345	0.03		0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
South Carolina	0.5	0.5	0.5	0		0.51	0.52	0.515	-0.01		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
South Dakota	0.53	0.57	0.55	-0.04		0.53	0.59	0.56	-0.06		0	-0.02	0.01
Tennessee	0.53	0.54	0.535	-0.01		0.56	0.56	0.56	0		-0.03	-0.02	0.025
Texas	0.49	0.46	0.475	0.03		0.51	0.48	0.495	0.03		-0.02	-0.02	0.02
Utah	0.43	0.49	0.46	-0.06		0.46	0.52	0.49	-0.06		-0.03	-0.03	**0.03**
Vermont	0.33	0.25	0.29	0.08		0.3	0.25	0.275	0.05		0.03	0	**-0.015**
Virginia	0.44	0.39	0.415	0.05		0.45	0.41	0.43	0.04		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
Washington	0.36	0.3	0.33	0.06		0.36	0.32	0.34	0.04		0	-0.02	0.01
West Virginia	0.59	0.62	0.605	-0.03		0.59	0.63	0.61	-0.04		0	-0.01	0.005
Wisconsin	0.4	0.44	0.42	-0.04		0.42	0.46	0.44	-0.04		-0.02	-0.02	0.02
Wyoming	0.61	0.65	0.63	-0.04		0.6	0.67	0.635	-0.07		0.01	-0.02	0.005

Appendix D – Data on Steel and Aluminum Tariffs

	Morning Consult May, 2018	Civiqs 30-May	Avg	Difference			Morning Consult June, 2018	Civiqs 1-Jul	Avg	Difference			Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
Alabama	0.63	0.58	0.605	0.05			0.63	0.58	0.605	0.05			0	0	0
Alaska	0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02			0.53	0.5	0.515	0.03			-0.02	0.03	-0.005
Arizona	0.49	0.47	0.48	0.02			0.48	0.47	0.475	0.01			0.01	0	-0.005
Arkansas	0.54	0.61	0.575	-0.07			0.55	0.62	0.585	-0.07			-0.01	-0.01	0.01
California	0.37	0.3	0.335	0.07		10	0.37	0.3	0.335	0.07		13	0	0	0
Colorado	0.4	0.39	0.395	0.01			0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03			-0.02	0	0.01
Connecticut	0.4	0.36	0.38	0.04			0.42	0.37	0.395	0.05			-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Delaware	0.4	0.39	0.395	0.01			0.42	0.4	0.41	0.02			-0.02	-0.01	0.015
Florida	0.5	0.48	0.49	0.02			0.51	0.47	0.49	0.04			-0.01	0.01	0
Georgia	0.51	0.46	0.485	0.05			0.5	0.46	0.48	0.04			0.01	0	-0.005
Hawaii	0.35	0.26	0.305	0.09			0.37	0.26	0.315	0.11			-0.02	0	0.01
Idaho	0.56	0.59	0.575	-0.03			0.55	0.59	0.57	-0.04			0.01	0	-0.005
Illinois	0.37	0.36	0.365	0.01			0.38	0.35	0.365	0.03			-0.01	0.01	0
Indiana	0.52	0.52	0.52	0			0.51	0.52	0.515	-0.01			0.01	0	-0.005
Iowa	0.44	0.46	0.45	-0.02			0.46	0.45	0.455	0.01			-0.02	0.01	0.005
Kansas	0.52	0.55	0.535	-0.03			0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02			0.01	0.02	-0.015
Kentucky	0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05			0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05			0	0	0
Louisiana	0.6	0.55	0.575	0.05			0.59	0.54	0.565	0.05			0.01	0	-0.01
Maine	0.45	0.39	0.42	0.06			0.48	0.4	0.44	0.08			-0.03	-0.01	**0.02**
Maryland	0.38	0.29	0.335	0.09			0.37	0.28	0.325	0.09			0.01	0.01	-0.01
Massachusetts	0.35	0.29	0.32	0.06			0.36	0.28	0.32	0.08			-0.01	0.01	0
Michigan	0.43	0.42	0.425	0.01			0.44	0.41	0.425	0.03			-0.01	0.01	0
Minnesota	0.41	0.42	0.415	-0.01			0.41	0.41	0.41	0			0	0.01	-0.005
Mississippi	0.59	0.54	0.565	0.05			0.6	0.54	0.57	0.06			-0.01	0	0.005
Missouri	0.5	0.55	0.525	-0.05			0.5	0.54	0.52	-0.04			0	0.01	-0.005
Montana	0.5	0.53	0.515	-0.03			0.52	0.53	0.525	-0.01			-0.02	0	0.01
Nebraska	0.51	0.54	0.525	-0.03			0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02			0	0.01	-0.005
Nevada	0.47	0.4	0.435	0.07			0.44	0.4	0.42	0.04			0.03	0	-0.015
New Hampshire	0.41	0.39	0.4	0.02			0.43	0.38	0.405	0.05			-0.02	0.01	0.005
New Jersey	0.4	0.36	0.38	0.04			0.42	0.36	0.39	0.06			-0.02	0	0.01
New Mexico	0.41	0.41	0.41	0			0.42	0.41	0.415	0.01			-0.01	0	0.005
New York	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02			0.38	0.34	0.36	0.04			-0.01	0.01	0
North Carolina	0.49	0.46	0.475	0.03			0.49	0.45	0.47	0.04			0	0.01	-0.005
North Dakota	0.51	0.67	0.59	-0.16			0.51	0.65	0.58	-0.14			0	0.02	-0.01
Ohio	0.46	0.48	0.47	-0.02			0.47	0.48	0.475	-0.01			-0.01	0	0.005
Oklahoma	0.53	0.63	0.58	-0.1			0.56	0.63	0.595	-0.07			-0.03	0	0.015
Oregon	0.39	0.35	0.37	0.04			0.39	0.34	0.365	0.05			0	0.01	-0.005
Pennsylvania	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.02			0.46	0.44	0.45	0.02			0	0	0
Rhode Island	0.36	0.33	0.345	0.03			0.39	0.32	0.355	0.07			-0.03	0.01	0.01
South Carolina	0.55	0.52	0.535	0.03			0.54	0.52	0.53	0.02			0.01	0	-0.005
South Dakota	0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05			0.55	0.58	0.565	-0.03			0	0.02	-0.01
Tennessee	0.58	0.56	0.57	0.02			0.55	0.55	0.55	0			0.03	0.01	**-0.02**
Texas	0.5	0.49	0.495	0.01			0.53	0.49	0.51	0.04			-0.03	0	0.015
Utah	0.48	0.52	0.5	-0.04			0.48	0.52	0.5	-0.04			0	0	0
Vermont	0.34	0.26	0.3	0.08			0.38	0.25	0.315	0.13			-0.04	0.01	0.015
Virginia	0.45	0.42	0.435	0.03			0.46	0.41	0.435	0.05			-0.01	0.01	0
Washington	0.36	0.33	0.345	0.03			0.37	0.33	0.35	0.04			-0.01	0	0.005
West Virginia	0.62	0.65	0.635	-0.03			0.6	0.64	0.62	-0.04			0.02	0.01	-0.015
Wisconsin	0.42	0.46	0.44	-0.04			0.41	0.45	0.43	-0.04			0.01	0.01	-0.01
Wyoming	0.62	0.64	0.63	-0.02			0.6	0.66	0.63	-0.06			0.02	-0.02	0

It's Complicated: President Trump's Relationship with the Media
Honors Thesis for Joseph Iamele

Appendix E – Data on Kim Jong-Un Meeting

	Morning Consult June, 2018	Civiqs 13-Jun	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult July, 2018	Civiqs 14-Jul	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
Alabama	0.63	0.58	0.605	0.05		0.63	0.58	0.605	0.05		0	0	0
Alaska	0.53	0.53	0.53	0		0.55	0.5	0.525	0.05		-0.02	0.03	-0.005
Arizona	0.48	0.47	0.475	0.01		0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		0	0.01	-0.005
Arkansas	0.55	0.61	0.58	-0.06		0.55	0.62	0.585	-0.07		0	-0.01	0.005
California	0.37	0.3	0.335	0.07	14	0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07	13	0.01	0.01	-0.01
Colorado	0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03		0.43	0.39	0.41	0.04		-0.01	0	0.005
Connecticut	0.42	0.35	0.385	0.07		0.4	0.37	0.385	0.03		0.02	-0.02	0
Delaware	0.42	0.4	0.41	0.02		0.41	0.4	0.405	0.01		0.01	0	-0.005
Florida	0.51	0.47	0.49	0.04		0.5	0.47	0.485	0.03		0.01	0	-0.005
Georgia	0.5	0.46	0.48	0.04		0.5	0.46	0.48	0.04		0	0	0
Hawaii	0.37	0.27	0.32	0.1		0.37	0.25	0.31	0.12		0	0.02	-0.01
Idaho	0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05		0.56	0.59	0.575	-0.03		-0.01	0.01	0
Illinois	0.38	0.35	0.365	0.03		0.38	0.34	0.36	0.04		0	0.01	-0.005
Indiana	0.51	0.52	0.515	-0.01		0.51	0.52	0.515	-0.01		0	0	0
Iowa	0.46	0.47	0.465	-0.01		0.45	0.45	0.45	0		0.01	0.02	-0.015
Kansas	0.51	0.55	0.53	-0.04		0.53	0.53	0.53	0		-0.02	0.02	0
Kentucky	0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05		0.55	0.59	0.57	-0.04		0	0.01	-0.005
Louisiana	0.59	0.54	0.565	0.05		0.59	0.54	0.565	0.05		0	0	0
Maine	0.48	0.39	0.435	0.09		0.45	0.39	0.42	0.06		0.03	0	-0.015
Maryland	0.37	0.29	0.33	0.08		0.38	0.28	0.33	0.1		-0.01	0.01	0
Massachusetts	0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07		0.35	0.29	0.32	0.06		0.01	0	-0.005
Michigan	0.44	0.42	0.43	0.02		0.42	0.41	0.415	0.01		0.02	0.01	-0.015
Minnesota	0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0	0	0
Mississippi	0.6	0.53	0.565	0.07		0.6	0.54	0.57	0.06		0	-0.01	0.005
Missouri	0.5	0.55	0.525	-0.05		0.52	0.54	0.53	-0.02		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Montana	0.52	0.52	0.52	0		0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02		0.01	-0.01	0
Nebraska	0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02		0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02		0	0	0
Nevada	0.44	0.39	0.415	0.05		0.45	0.39	0.42	0.06		-0.01	0	0.005
New Hampshire	0.43	0.39	0.41	0.04		0.42	0.38	0.4	0.04		0.01	0.01	-0.01
New Jersey	0.42	0.36	0.39	0.06		0.42	0.36	0.39	0.06		0	0	0
New Mexico	0.42	0.41	0.415	0.01		0.42	0.41	0.415	0.01		0	0	0
New York	0.38	0.34	0.36	0.04		0.38	0.34	0.36	0.04		0	0	0
North Carolina	0.49	0.46	0.475	0.03		0.48	0.45	0.465	0.03		0.01	0.01	-0.01
North Dakota	0.51	0.65	0.58	-0.14		0.5	0.65	0.575	-0.15		0.01	0	-0.005
Ohio	0.47	0.48	0.475	-0.01		0.48	0.48	0.48	0		-0.01	0	0.005
Oklahoma	0.56	0.63	0.595	-0.07		0.55	0.62	0.585	-0.07		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Oregon	0.39	0.34	0.365	0.05		0.38	0.34	0.36	0.04		0.01	0	-0.005
Pennsylvania	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.02		0.45	0.44	0.445	0.01		0.01	0	-0.005
Rhode Island	0.39	0.33	0.36	0.06		0.38	0.31	0.345	0.07		0.01	0.02	-0.015
South Carolina	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.02		0.54	0.52	0.53	0.02		0	0	0
South Dakota	0.55	0.58	0.565	-0.03		0.56	0.58	0.57	-0.02		-0.01	0	0.005
Tennessee	0.55	0.56	0.555	-0.01		0.56	0.56	0.56	0		-0.01	0	0.005
Texas	0.53	0.49	0.51	0.04		0.52	0.49	0.505	0.03		0.01	0	-0.005
Utah	0.48	0.53	0.505	-0.05		0.47	0.52	0.495	-0.05		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Vermont	0.38	0.25	0.315	0.13		0.37	0.25	0.31	0.12		0.01	0	-0.005
Virginia	0.46	0.41	0.435	0.05		0.45	0.41	0.43	0.04		0.01	0	-0.005
Washington	0.37	0.32	0.345	0.05		0.37	0.33	0.35	0.04		0	-0.01	0.005
West Virginia	0.6	0.64	0.62	-0.04		0.63	0.64	0.635	-0.01		-0.03	0	**0.015**
Wisconsin	0.41	0.45	0.43	-0.04		0.41	0.45	0.43	-0.04		0	0	0
Wyoming	0.6	0.66	0.63	-0.06		0.63	0.66	0.645	-0.03		-0.03	0	**0.015**

Appendix F – Data on Government Shutdown

	Morning Consu	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consu	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
	December, 2018	22-Dec				January, 2019	22-Jan						
Alabama	0.58	0.57	0.575	0.01		0.58	0.59	0.585	-0.01		0	-0.02	0.01
Alaska	0.49	0.53	0.51	-0.04		0.48	0.53	0.505	-0.05		0.01	0	-0.005
Arizona	0.44	0.46	0.45	-0.02		0.44	0.48	0.46	-0.04		0	-0.02	0.01
Arkansas	0.53	0.59	0.56	-0.06		0.53	0.62	0.575	-0.09		0	-0.03	0.015
California	0.33	0.28	0.305	0.05	11	0.33	0.3	0.315	0.03	13	0	-0.02	0.01
Colorado	0.4	0.38	0.39	0.02		0.39	0.39	0.39	0		0.01	-0.01	0
Connecticut	0.38	0.34	0.36	0.04		0.36	0.37	0.365	-0.01		0.02	-0.03	0.005
Delaware	0.4	0.4	0.4	0		0.41	0.4	0.405	0.01		-0.01	0	0.005
Florida	0.46	0.47	0.465	-0.01		0.46	0.48	0.47	-0.02		0	-0.01	0.005
Georgia	0.46	0.46	0.46	0		0.47	0.48	0.475	-0.01		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
Hawaii	0.34	0.27	0.305	0.07		0.34	0.28	0.31	0.06		0	-0.01	0.005
Idaho	0.53	0.58	0.555	-0.05		0.56	0.59	0.575	-0.03		-0.03	-0.01	**0.02**
Illinois	0.37	0.33	0.35	0.04		0.37	0.36	0.365	0.01		0	-0.03	0.015
Indiana	0.52	0.51	0.515	0.01		0.5	0.53	0.515	-0.03		0.02	-0.02	0
Iowa	0.43	0.45	0.44	-0.02		0.41	0.47	0.44	-0.06		0.02	-0.02	0
Kansas	0.49	0.53	0.51	-0.04		0.49	0.55	0.52	-0.06		0	-0.02	0.01
Kentucky	0.55	0.59	0.57	-0.04		0.55	0.61	0.58	-0.06		0	-0.02	0.01
Louisiana	0.54	0.54	0.54	0		0.55	0.55	0.55	0		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Maine	0.45	0.35	0.4	0.1		0.43	0.38	0.405	0.05		0.02	-0.03	0.005
Maryland	0.34	0.28	0.31	0.06		0.33	0.3	0.315	0.03		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Massachusetts	0.33	0.26	0.295	0.07		0.33	0.27	0.3	0.06		0	-0.01	0.005
Michigan	0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0.4	0.43	0.415	-0.03		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Minnesota	0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0.39	0.42	0.405	-0.03		0.02	-0.01	-0.005
Mississippi	0.56	0.53	0.545	0.03		0.54	0.54	0.54	0		0.02	-0.01	-0.005
Missouri	0.49	0.53	0.51	-0.04		0.47	0.56	0.515	-0.09		0.02	-0.03	0.005
Montana	0.5	0.51	0.505	-0.01		0.49	0.54	0.515	-0.05		0.01	-0.03	0.01
Nebraska	0.52	0.52	0.52	0		0.48	0.53	0.505	-0.05		0.04	-0.01	-0.015
Nevada	0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03		0.42	0.41	0.415	0.01		0	-0.02	0.01
New Hampshire	0.44	0.37	0.405	0.07		0.39	0.38	0.385	0.01		0.05	-0.01	**-0.02**
New Jersey	0.39	0.36	0.375	0.03		0.39	0.38	0.385	0.01		0	-0.02	0.01
New Mexico	0.38	0.41	0.395	-0.03		0.39	0.43	0.41	-0.04		-0.01	-0.02	0.015
New York	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.02		0.36	0.35	0.355	0.01		0	-0.01	0.005
North Carolina	0.46	0.44	0.45	0.02		0.46	0.45	0.455	0.01		0	-0.01	0.005
North Dakota	0.52	0.66	0.59	-0.14		0.5	0.66	0.58	-0.16		0.02	0	-0.01
Ohio	0.46	0.47	0.465	-0.01		0.45	0.49	0.47	-0.04		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Oklahoma	0.54	0.61	0.575	-0.07		0.53	0.63	0.58	-0.1		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Oregon	0.37	0.34	0.355	0.03		0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02		0	-0.01	0.005
Pennsylvania	0.45	0.44	0.445	0.01		0.43	0.45	0.44	-0.02		0.02	-0.01	-0.005
Rhode Island	0.38	0.32	0.35	0.06		0.39	0.32	0.355	0.07		-0.01	0	0.005
South Carolina	0.52	0.5	0.51	0.02		0.52	0.51	0.515	0.01		0	-0.01	0.005
South Dakota	0.55	0.58	0.565	-0.03		0.51	0.59	0.55	-0.08		0.04	-0.01	-0.015
Tennessee	0.56	0.57	0.565	-0.01		0.54	0.58	0.56	-0.04		0.02	-0.01	-0.005
Texas	0.49	0.49	0.49	0		0.48	0.51	0.495	-0.03		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Utah	0.49	0.51	0.5	-0.02		0.45	0.52	0.485	-0.07		0.04	-0.01	-0.015
Vermont	0.33	0.25	0.29	0.08		0.31	0.26	0.285	0.05		0.02	-0.01	-0.005
Virginia	0.46	0.4	0.43	0.06		0.43	0.42	0.425	0.01		0.03	-0.02	-0.005
Washington	0.36	0.33	0.345	0.03		0.35	0.35	0.35	0		0.01	-0.02	0.005
West Virginia	0.61	0.63	0.62	-0.02		0.6	0.65	0.625	-0.05		0.01	-0.02	0.005
Wisconsin	0.42	0.44	0.43	-0.02		0.4	0.47	0.435	-0.07		0.02	-0.03	0.005
Wyoming	0.64	0.66	0.65	-0.02		0.63	0.66	0.645	-0.03		0.01	0	-0.005

Appendix G – Data on Jim Acosta Incident

	Morning Consult November, 2018	Civiqs 7-Nov	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult December, 2018	Civiqs 8-Dec	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
Alabama	0.62	0.59	0.605	0.03		0.58	0.58	0.58	0		0.04	0.01	-0.025
Alaska	0.53	0.53	0.53	0		0.49	0.52	0.505	-0.03		0.04	0.01	-0.025
Arizona	0.47	0.47	0.47	0		0.44	0.46	0.45	-0.02		0.03	0.01	-0.02
Arkansas	0.55	0.61	0.58	-0.06		0.53	0.61	0.57	-0.08		0.02	0	-0.01
California	0.35	0.3	0.325	0.05	10	0.33	0.29	0.31	0.04	11	0.02	0.01	-0.015
Colorado	0.43	0.39	0.41	0.04		0.4	0.39	0.395	0.01		0.03	0	-0.015
Connecticut	0.38	0.36	0.37	0.02		0.38	0.36	0.37	0.02		0	0	0
Delaware	0.42	0.4	0.41	0.02		0.4	0.37	0.385	0.03		0.02	0.03	-0.025
Florida	0.49	0.48	0.485	0.01		0.46	0.47	0.465	-0.01		0.03	0.01	-0.02
Georgia	0.49	0.47	0.48	0.02		0.46	0.46	0.46	0		0.03	0.01	-0.02
Hawaii	0.38	0.27	0.325	0.11		0.34	0.27	0.305	0.07		0.04	0	-0.02
Idaho	0.56	0.6	0.58	-0.04		0.53	0.59	0.56	-0.06		0.03	0.01	-0.02
Illinois	0.38	0.34	0.36	0.04		0.37	0.34	0.355	0.03		0.01	0	-0.005
Indiana	0.52	0.52	0.52	0		0.52	0.52	0.52	0		0	0	0
Iowa	0.44	0.45	0.445	-0.01		0.43	0.45	0.44	-0.02		0.01	0	-0.005
Kansas	0.5	0.54	0.52	-0.04		0.49	0.54	0.515	-0.05		0.01	0	-0.005
Kentucky	0.56	0.59	0.575	-0.03		0.55	0.59	0.57	-0.04		0.01	0	-0.005
Louisiana	0.58	0.54	0.56	0.04		0.54	0.52	0.53	0.02		0.04	0.02	**-0.03**
Maine	0.44	0.37	0.405	0.07		0.45	0.37	0.41	0.08		-0.01	0	0.005
Maryland	0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07		0.34	0.29	0.315	0.05		0.02	0	-0.01
Massachusetts	0.36	0.28	0.32	0.08		0.33	0.27	0.3	0.06		0.03	0.01	-0.02
Michigan	0.43	0.42	0.425	0.01		0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0.02	0.01	-0.015
Minnesota	0.43	0.42	0.425	0.01		0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0.02	0.01	-0.015
Mississippi	0.57	0.54	0.555	0.03		0.56	0.54	0.55	0.02		0.01	0	-0.005
Missouri	0.53	0.55	0.54	-0.02		0.49	0.55	0.52	-0.06		0.04	0	-0.02
Montana	0.54	0.54	0.54	0		0.5	0.53	0.515	-0.03		0.04	0.01	-0.025
Nebraska	0.51	0.54	0.525	-0.03		0.52	0.53	0.525	-0.01		-0.01	0.01	0
Nevada	0.45	0.39	0.42	0.06		0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03		0.03	0	-0.015
New Hampshire	0.42	0.38	0.4	0.04		0.44	0.37	0.405	0.07		-0.02	0.01	**0.005**
New Jersey	0.42	0.37	0.395	0.05		0.39	0.37	0.38	0.02		0.03	0	-0.015
New Mexico	0.4	0.42	0.41	-0.02		0.38	0.42	0.4	-0.04		0.02	0	-0.01
New York	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02		0.36	0.34	0.35	0.02		0.01	0.01	-0.01
North Carolina	0.49	0.44	0.465	0.05		0.46	0.44	0.45	0.02		0.03	0	-0.015
North Dakota	0.5	0.65	0.575	-0.15		0.52	0.64	0.58	-0.12		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Ohio	0.48	0.48	0.48	0		0.46	0.48	0.47	-0.02		0.02	0	-0.01
Oklahoma	0.56	0.62	0.59	-0.06		0.54	0.61	0.575	-0.07		0.02	0.01	-0.015
Oregon	0.38	0.35	0.365	0.03		0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02		0.01	0	-0.005
Pennsylvania	0.46	0.45	0.455	0.01		0.45	0.44	0.445	0.01		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Rhode Island	0.4	0.31	0.355	0.09		0.38	0.32	0.35	0.06		0.02	-0.01	-0.005
South Carolina	0.54	0.51	0.525	0.03		0.52	0.51	0.515	0.01		0.02	0	-0.01
South Dakota	0.57	0.59	0.58	-0.02		0.55	0.58	0.565	-0.03		0.02	0.01	-0.015
Tennessee	0.6	0.58	0.59	0.02		0.56	0.57	0.565	-0.01		0.04	0.01	-0.025
Texas	0.51	0.49	0.5	0.02		0.49	0.49	0.49	0		0.02	0	-0.01
Utah	0.5	0.52	0.51	-0.02		0.49	0.5	0.495	-0.01		0.01	0.02	-0.015
Vermont	0.36	0.26	0.31	0.1		0.33	0.24	0.285	0.09		0.03	0.02	-0.025
Virginia	0.46	0.41	0.435	0.05		0.46	0.41	0.435	0.05		0	0	0
Washington	0.37	0.33	0.35	0.04		0.36	0.33	0.345	0.03		0.01	0	-0.005
West Virginia	0.63	0.64	0.635	-0.01		0.61	0.64	0.625	-0.03		0.02	0	-0.01
Wisconsin	0.43	0.46	0.445	-0.03		0.42	0.45	0.435	-0.03		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Wyoming	0.66	0.67	0.665	-0.01		0.64	0.66	0.65	-0.02		0.02	0.01	-0.015

Appendix H – Data on Impeachment

	Morning Consult	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
	December, 2019	19-Dec				January, 2020	20-Jan						
Alabama	0.59	0.59	0.59	0		0.6	0.6	0.6	0		-0.01	-0.01	0.01
Alaska	0.47	0.53	0.5	-0.06		0.48	0.51	0.495	-0.03		-0.01	0.02	-0.005
Arizona	0.47	0.48	0.475	-0.01		0.48	0.47	0.475	0.01		-0.01	0.01	0
Arkansas	0.53	0.63	0.58	-0.1		0.55	0.63	0.59	-0.08		-0.02	0	0.01
California	0.34	0.3	0.32	0.04	11	0.33	0.3	0.315	0.03	10	0.01	0	-0.005
Colorado	0.39	0.41	0.4	-0.02		0.43	0.4	0.415	0.03		-0.04	0.01	0.015
Connecticut	0.38	0.36	0.37	0.02		0.39	0.36	0.375	0.03		-0.01	0	0.005
Delaware	0.41	0.4	0.405	0.01		0.43	0.4	0.415	0.03		-0.02	0	0.01
Florida	0.48	0.47	0.475	0.01		0.49	0.47	0.48	0.02		-0.01	0	0.005
Georgia	0.47	0.46	0.465	0.01		0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		-0.01	0	0.005
Hawaii	0.34	0.27	0.305	0.07		0.35	0.27	0.31	0.08		-0.01	0	0.005
Idaho	0.56	0.62	0.59	-0.06		0.6	0.61	0.605	-0.01		-0.04	0.01	**0.015**
Illinois	0.37	0.35	0.36	0.02		0.39	0.35	0.37	0.04		-0.02	0	0.01
Indiana	0.5	0.54	0.52	-0.04		0.53	0.53	0.53	0		-0.03	0.01	0.01
Iowa	0.44	0.47	0.455	-0.03		0.44	0.48	0.46	-0.04		0	-0.01	0.005
Kansas	0.52	0.53	0.525	-0.01		0.52	0.53	0.525	-0.01		0	0	0
Kentucky	0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05		0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05		0	0	0
Louisiana	0.53	0.54	0.535	-0.01		0.56	0.54	0.55	0.02		-0.03	0	**0.015**
Maine	0.46	0.38	0.42	0.08		0.45	0.38	0.415	0.07		0.01	0	-0.005
Maryland	0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07		0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07		0	0	0
Massachusetts	0.33	0.29	0.31	0.04		0.34	0.29	0.315	0.05		-0.01	0	0.005
Michigan	0.4	0.43	0.415	-0.03		0.42	0.44	0.43	-0.02		-0.02	-0.01	**0.015**
Minnesota	0.43	0.43	0.43	0		0.45	0.42	0.435	0.03		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Mississippi	0.55	0.55	0.55	0		0.55	0.54	0.545	0.01		0	0.01	-0.005
Missouri	0.51	0.57	0.54	-0.06		0.53	0.56	0.545	-0.03		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Montana	0.5	0.5	0.5	0		0.51	0.5	0.505	0.01		-0.01	0	0.005
Nebraska	0.49	0.54	0.515	-0.05		0.49	0.53	0.51	-0.04		0	0.01	-0.005
Nevada	0.42	0.41	0.415	0.01		0.41	0.41	0.41	0		0.01	0	-0.005
New Hampshire	0.39	0.41	0.4	-0.02		0.42	0.4	0.41	0.02		-0.03	0.01	0.01
New Jersey	0.41	0.36	0.385	0.05		0.42	0.36	0.39	0.06		-0.01	0	0.005
New Mexico	0.43	0.44	0.435	-0.01		0.43	0.42	0.425	0.01		0	0.02	-0.01
New York	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.02		0.37	0.34	0.355	0.03		-0.01	0	0.005
North Carolina	0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		0	0	0
North Dakota	0.51	0.69	0.6	-0.18		0.53	0.63	0.58	-0.1		-0.02	0.06	-0.02
Ohio	0.46	0.51	0.485	-0.05		0.47	0.51	0.49	-0.04		-0.01	0	0.005
Oklahoma	0.52	0.62	0.57	-0.1		0.56	0.6	0.58	-0.04		-0.04	0.02	0.01
Oregon	0.38	0.36	0.37	0.02		0.4	0.35	0.375	0.05		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Pennsylvania	0.46	0.46	0.46	0		0.48	0.45	0.465	0.03		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Rhode Island	0.37	0.34	0.355	0.03		0.38	0.32	0.35	0.06		-0.01	0.02	-0.005
South Carolina	0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02		0.55	0.52	0.535	0.03		-0.04	0.01	**0.015**
South Dakota	0.51	0.6	0.555	-0.09		0.53	0.59	0.56	-0.06		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Tennessee	0.56	0.57	0.565	-0.01		0.57	0.56	0.565	0.01		-0.01	0.01	0
Texas	0.48	0.5	0.49	-0.02		0.51	0.5	0.505	0.01		-0.03	0	**0.015**
Utah	0.52	0.52	0.52	0		0.52	0.52	0.52	0		0	0	0
Vermont	0.31	0.27	0.29	0.04		0.32	0.26	0.29	0.06		-0.01	0.01	0
Virginia	0.46	0.41	0.435	0.05		0.47	0.41	0.44	0.06		-0.01	0	0.005
Washington	0.36	0.33	0.345	0.03		0.36	0.34	0.35	0.02		0	-0.01	0.005
West Virginia	0.59	0.62	0.605	-0.03		0.59	0.62	0.605	-0.03		0	0	0
Wisconsin	0.44	0.47	0.455	-0.03		0.43	0.47	0.45	-0.04		0.01	0	-0.005
Wyoming	0.62	0.7	0.66	-0.08		0.62	0.65	0.635	-0.03		0	0.05	**-0.025**

Appendix I – Data on Iran Strike

	Morning Consu	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consu	Civiqs	Avg	Difference		Morning Consult Difference	Civiqs Difference	Avg. Difference
	January	4-Jan				February	5-Feb						
Alabama	0.6	0.59	0.595	0.01		0.62	0.59	0.605	0.03		-0.02	0	0.01
Alaska	0.48	0.54	0.51	-0.06		0.51	0.53	0.52	-0.02		-0.03	0.01	0.01
Arizona	0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		0.49	0.45	0.47	0.04		-0.01	0.01	0
Arkansas	0.55	0.62	0.585	-0.07		0.54	0.62	0.58	-0.08		0.01	0	-0.005
California	0.33	0.3	0.315	0.03	11	0.34	0.29	0.315	0.05	11	-0.01	0.01	0
Colorado	0.43	0.41	0.42	0.02		0.42	0.4	0.41	0.02		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Connecticut	0.39	0.37	0.38	0.02		0.4	0.36	0.38	0.04		-0.01	0.01	0
Delaware	0.43	0.36	0.395	0.07		0.43	0.36	0.395	0.07		0	0	0
Florida	0.49	0.47	0.48	0.02		0.5	0.46	0.48	0.04		-0.01	0.01	0
Georgia	0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		0.49	0.46	0.475	0.03		-0.01	0	0.005
Hawaii	0.35	0.29	0.32	0.06		0.38	0.29	0.335	0.09		-0.03	0	**0.015**
Idaho	0.6	0.61	0.605	-0.01		0.58	0.61	0.595	-0.03		0.02	0	-0.01
Illinois	0.39	0.35	0.37	0.04		0.39	0.35	0.37	0.04		0	0	0
Indiana	0.53	0.53	0.53	0		0.53	0.53	0.53	0		0	0	0
Iowa	0.44	0.47	0.455	-0.03		0.46	0.46	0.46	0		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Kansas	0.52	0.53	0.525	-0.01		0.51	0.52	0.515	-0.01		0.01	0.01	-0.01
Kentucky	0.55	0.6	0.575	-0.05		0.57	0.6	0.585	-0.03		-0.02	0	0.01
Louisiana	0.56	0.54	0.55	0.02		0.59	0.54	0.565	0.05		-0.03	0	0.015
Maine	0.45	0.38	0.415	0.07		0.46	0.38	0.42	0.08		-0.01	0	0.005
Maryland	0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07		0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07		0	0	0
Massachusetts	0.34	0.3	0.32	0.04		0.36	0.29	0.325	0.07		-0.02	0.01	0.005
Michigan	0.42	0.43	0.425	-0.01		0.43	0.43	0.43	0		-0.01	0	0.005
Minnesota	0.45	0.43	0.44	0.02		0.46	0.42	0.44	0.04		-0.01	0.01	0
Mississippi	0.55	0.55	0.55	0		0.55	0.54	0.545	0.01		0	0.01	-0.005
Missouri	0.53	0.56	0.545	-0.03		0.52	0.56	0.54	-0.04		0.01	0	-0.005
Montana	0.51	0.51	0.51	0		0.52	0.51	0.515	0.01		-0.01	0	0.005
Nebraska	0.49	0.54	0.515	-0.05		0.52	0.53	0.525	-0.01		-0.03	0.01	0.01
Nevada	0.41	0.42	0.415	-0.01		0.43	0.41	0.42	0.02		-0.02	0.01	0.005
New Hampshire	0.42	0.39	0.405	0.03		0.4	0.38	0.39	0.02		0.02	0.01	-0.015
New Jersey	0.42	0.36	0.39	0.06		0.42	0.35	0.385	0.07		0	0.01	-0.005
New Mexico	0.43	0.45	0.44	-0.02		0.43	0.44	0.435	-0.01		0	0.01	-0.005
New York	0.37	0.34	0.355	0.03		0.38	0.33	0.355	0.05		-0.01	0.01	0
North Carolina	0.48	0.46	0.47	0.02		0.51	0.45	0.48	0.06		-0.03	0.01	0.01
North Dakota	0.53	0.67	0.6	-0.14		0.53	0.67	0.6	-0.14		0	0	0
Ohio	0.47	0.5	0.485	-0.03		0.48	0.5	0.49	-0.02		-0.01	0	0.005
Oklahoma	0.56	0.61	0.585	-0.05		0.56	0.6	0.58	-0.04		0	0.01	-0.005
Oregon	0.4	0.37	0.385	0.03		0.38	0.37	0.375	0.01		0.02	0	-0.01
Pennsylvania	0.48	0.45	0.465	0.03		0.48	0.45	0.465	0.03		0	0	0
Rhode Island	0.38	0.32	0.35	0.06		0.39	0.32	0.355	0.07		-0.01	0	0.005
South Carolina	0.55	0.52	0.535	0.03		0.55	0.52	0.535	0.03		0	0	0
South Dakota	0.53	0.6	0.565	-0.07		0.54	0.6	0.57	-0.06		-0.01	0	0.005
Tennessee	0.57	0.56	0.565	0.01		0.57	0.55	0.56	0.02		0	0.01	-0.005
Texas	0.51	0.5	0.505	0.01		0.52	0.5	0.51	0.02		-0.01	0	0.005
Utah	0.52	0.52	0.52	0		0.54	0.52	0.53	0.02		-0.02	0	0.01
Vermont	0.32	0.27	0.295	0.05		0.29	0.26	0.275	0.03		0.03	0.01	**-0.02**
Virginia	0.47	0.41	0.44	0.06		0.46	0.41	0.435	0.05		0.01	0	-0.005
Washington	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.02		0.35	0.33	0.34	0.02		0.01	0.01	-0.01
West Virginia	0.59	0.63	0.61	-0.04		0.61	0.63	0.62	-0.02		-0.02	0	0.01
Wisconsin	0.43	0.47	0.45	-0.04		0.43	0.47	0.45	-0.04		0	0	0
Wyoming	0.62	0.65	0.635	-0.03		0.62	0.64	0.63	-0.02		0	0.01	-0.005

Appendix J – Analysis

State	Travel B.	Tax L.	Steel & Aluminum Tariff	Kim Meetin	Gov't Shutdov	Impeachme	Hurricane Mar	Jim Accosta Eve	Iran Stri	Min	Max	Media	Mean	Stand
Louisiana	0.02	0.025	-0.01	0	0.01	0.015	-0.01	-0.03	0.015	-0.03	0.025	0.01	0.00389	0.0168
Tennessee	-0.01	0.025	-0.02	0.005	-0.005	0	0	-0.025	-0.005	-0.025	0.025	-0.005	-0.0039	0.0137
Utah	0	0.03	0	-0.01	-0.015	0	-0.025	-0.015	0.01	-0.025	0.03	0	-0.0028	0.0153
Wyoming	0.015	0.005	0	0.015	-0.005	-0.025	0.025	-0.015	-0.005	-0.025	0.025	0	0.00111	0.01487
New Hampshire	-0.005	0.03	0.005	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.015	0.005	-0.015	-0.02	0.03	0.005	0.00167	0.01491
Georgia	0	0.03	-0.005	0	0.015	0.005	0.015	-0.02	0.005	-0.02	0.03	0.005	0.005	0.01333
Kansas	-0.005	0.025	-0.015	0	0.01	0	0.005	-0.005	-0.01	-0.015	0.025	0	0.00056	0.01117
Nevada	0.025	0.02	-0.015	0.005	0.01	-0.005	-0.005	-0.015	0.005	-0.015	0.025	0.005	0.00278	0.01336
Alabama	0.015	0.02	0	0	0.01	0.01	0.005	-0.025	0.01	-0.025	0.02	0.01	0.005	0.01225
Alaska	0.02	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.015	-0.025	0.01	-0.025	0.02	-0.005	-0.0006	0.01279
Delaware	-0.015	0.01	0.015	-0.005	0.005	0.01	0.005	-0.025	0	-0.025	0.015	0.005	0	0.01225
Montana	-0.02	0	0.01	0	0.01	0.005	0.015	-0.025	0.005	-0.025	0.015	0.005	0	0.01291
Vermont	-0.03	-0.015	0.015	-0.005	-0.005	0	-0.01	-0.025	-0.02	-0.03	0.015	-0.01	-0.0106	0.01301
Connecticut	-0.03	0.02	0.015	0	0.005	0.005	0.01	0	0	-0.03	0.02	0.005	0.00278	0.01336
New Mexico	-0.02	0.005	0.005	0	0.015	-0.01	-0.025	-0.01	-0.005	-0.025	0.015	-0.005	-0.005	0.01202
Idaho	0.005	0.015	-0.005	0	0.02	0.015	-0.025	-0.02	-0.01	-0.025	0.02	0	-0.0006	0.01499
Florida	-0.005	0.015	0	-0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.02	0	-0.02	0.015	0	0	0.00913
Missouri	0.015	0.01	-0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0	-0.02	-0.005	-0.02	0.015	0.005	0.00111	0.00965
Illinois	-0.02	0.02	0	-0.005	0.015	0.01	0.005	-0.005	0	-0.02	0.02	0	0.00222	0.01133
Hawaii	0.01	-0.015	0.01	-0.01	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.02	0.015	-0.02	0.015	0.005	0.00056	0.01165
Arizona	-0.01	0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.01	0	0.015	-0.02	0	-0.02	0.015	0	-0.0011	0.00994
Massachusetts	-0.015	0.01	0	-0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.005	-0.02	0.005	-0.02	0.01	0	-0.0022	0.00946
Washington	-0.01	0.01	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.02	-0.005	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.005	-0.0017	0.00943
North Dakota	0	0.015	-0.01	-0.005	-0.01	-0.02	-0.005	0.005	0	-0.02	0.015	-0.005	-0.0033	0.00943
Kentucky	-0.005	0.015	0	-0.005	0.01	0	-0.02	-0.005	0.01	-0.02	0.015	0	2.5E-17	0.01
Oklahoma	-0.005	0.02	0.015	-0.01	0.005	0.01	-0.005	-0.015	-0.005	-0.015	0.02	-0.005	0.00111	0.01125
Texas	0.01	0.02	0.015	-0.005	0.005	0.015	-0.015	-0.01	0.005	-0.015	0.02	0.005	0.00444	0.01141
Minnesota	0.005	0.02	-0.005	0	-0.005	0.005	0	-0.015	0	-0.015	0.02	0	0.00056	0.00896
Colorado	0.005	0	0.01	0.005	0	0.015	-0.005	-0.015	-0.01	-0.015	0.015	0	0.00056	0.00896
Nebraska	-0.015	0.015	-0.005	0	-0.015	-0.005	0.005	0	0.01	-0.015	0.015	0	-0.0011	0.00965
New Jersey	-0.005	0.015	0.01	0	0.01	0.005	0.005	-0.015	-0.005	-0.015	0.015	0.005	0.00222	0.00885
Rhode Island	0.005	0.015	0.01	-0.015	0.005	-0.005	0	-0.005	0.005	-0.015	0.015	0.005	0.00167	0.0085
West Virginia	0	0.005	-0.015	0.015	0.005	0	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.015	0.015	0.005	0.00222	0.00916
Michigan	-0.005	0.01	0	-0.015	0.005	0.015	0	-0.015	0.005	-0.015	0.015	0	0	0.00972
Indiana	-0.015	0.005	-0.005	0	0	0.01	-0.015	0	0	-0.015	0.01	0	-0.0022	0.00786
South Dakota	0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.005	-0.015	0.005	0.01	-0.015	0.005	-0.015	0.01	0.005	0.00056	0.01012
Maine	0.005	0	0.02	-0.015	0.005	-0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.015	0.02	0.005	0.00278	0.00885
North Carolina	0	0.01	-0.005	-0.01	0.005	0	-0.01	-0.015	0.01	-0.015	0.01	0	-0.0017	0.0085
California	-0.01	0.01	0	-0.01	0.01	-0.005	-0.005	-0.015	0	-0.015	0.01	-0.005	-0.0028	0.0082
Iowa	-0.01	0.005	0.005	-0.015	0	0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.005	-0.015	0.005	0	-0.0017	0.00707
Wisconsin	-0.005	0.02	-0.01	0	0.005	-0.005	0	-0.01	0	-0.01	0.02	0	-0.0006	0.00864
New York	-0.005	0.015	0	0	0.005	0.005	-0.005	-0.01	0	-0.01	0.015	0	0.00056	0.00685
South Carolina	0.015	0.015	-0.005	0	0.005	0.015	0.01	-0.01	0	-0.01	0.015	0.005	0.005	0.00882
Ohio	-0.01	0.015	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.01	-0.01	0.005	-0.01	0.015	0.005	0.00111	0.00843
Arkansas	-0.005	0.01	0.01	0.005	0.015	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.005	-0.01	0.015	0.01	0.00444	0.00831
Pennsylvania	0.005	0.01	0	-0.005	-0.005	0.005	-0.01	-0.01	0	-0.01	0.01	0	-0.0011	0.00657
Oregon	-0.005	0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.01	-0.005	-0.01	-0.01	0.005	-0.005	-0.0028	0.00583
Maryland	-0.005	0.01	-0.01	0	0.005	0	0.005	-0.01	0	-0.01	0.01	0	-0.0006	0.00643
Virginia	0.01	0.015	0	-0.005	-0.005	0.005	0.02	0	-0.005	-0.005	0.02	0	0.00389	0.00875
Mississippi	0	0.01	0.005	0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.01	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.01	0	0.00111	0.00614

REFERENCES

Bump, Philip. "The President Was Never Intended to Be the Most Powerful Part of Government." The Washington Post. February 13, 2017. Accessed September 12, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/02/13/the-president-was-never-intended-to-be-the-most-powerful-part-of-government/?utm_term=.c2e97262eb94.

Clarke, Isobelle, and Jack Grieve. 2019. "Stylistic Variation on the Donald Trump Twitter Account: A Linguistic Analysis of Tweets Posted between 2009 and 2018." PLoS ONE 14 (9): 1–27. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0222062.

Continetti, Matthew. 2016. "Donald Trump, Media Darling." Commentary 142 (4): 56–55. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=122922132&site=ehost-live.

DeSilver, Drew. "Clinton's Impeachment Barely Dented His Public Support, and It Turned off Many Americans." Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, October 3, 2019. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/03/clintons-impeachment-barely-dented-his-public-support-and-it-turned-off-many-americans/.

Edwards, George C., and B. Dan Wood. "Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media." The American Political Science Review 93, no. 2 (1999): 327-44. doi:10.2307/2585399.

Edwards, George C., William G. Howell, and Stephen J. Wayne. "Legislative Skills." In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. : Oxford University Press, 2009-08-06.

https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001
/oxfordhb-9780199238859-e-14.

Elrich, Lara. 2018. "The War on Fake News: College of Communication." College of

Communication The War on Fake News Comments. Accessed October 15, 2019.

http://www.bu.edu/com/comtalk/the-war-on-fake-news/.

Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew. "Traditional Media, Social Media, and Different Presidential

Campaign Messages." In Controlling the Message: New Media in American Political

Campaigns, edited by Farrar-Myers Victoria A. and Vaughn Justin S., 136-52. NYU

Press, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt15r3xsj.11.

Heclo, Hugh, "The Permanent Campaign." The Public Presidency: Press, Media, and Public

Approval (2000)

Hershey, Marjorie Randon. "The President and the Media: The Case of Donald Trump."

2018

Hochschild, Arlie Russell. "The Ecstatic Edge of Politics: Sociology and Donald Trump."

Contemporary Sociology 45, no. 6 (2016): 683-89.

http://www.jstor.org/stable/43998965.

Kernel, Samuel, "Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership." The American

Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (1987): 1368.

Kohut, Andrew. "From the Archives: How the Watergate Crisis Eroded Public Support for

Richard Nixon." Pew Research Center. Pew Research Center, September 25, 2019.

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/09/25/how-the-watergate-crisis-eroded-

public-support-for-richard-nixon/.

Mayer, Jeremy. "The Contemporary Presidency: The Presidency and Image management: discipline in Pursuit of Illusion." Presidential Studies Quarterly. 2004

Milligan, Susan. "The Year of the Underdog? ." U.S. News & World Report. U.S. News & World Report, August 28, 2015. https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/08/28/2016-may-be-the-year-of-the-underdog-with-trump-sanders-and-carson.

Miroff, Bruce. "The Presidential Spectacle." The Presidency and the Political System, no. 11. 2018

Mitchell, Amy. "Americans Still Prefer Watching to Reading the News - and Mostly Still Through Television." Pew Research Center's Journalism Project, September 17, 2019. https://www.journalism.org/2018/12/03/americans-still-prefer-watching-to-reading-the-news-and-mostly-still-through-television/.

Roese, Vivian. "You Won't Believe How Co-dependent They Are: Or: Media Hype and the Interaction of News Media, Social Media, and the User." In From Media Hype to Twitter Storm: News Explosions and Their Impact on Issues, Crises, and Public Opinion, edited by Vasterman Peter, 313-32. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018. doi:10.2307/j.ctt21215m0.19.

Roosevelt, Theodore. *The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt*, Centennial ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), pp. 197-200

Schroeder, Ralph. "Digital Media and the Rise of Right-wing Populism." In Social Theory after the Internet: Media, Technology, and Globalization, 60-81. London: UCL Press, 2018. doi:10.2307/j.ctt20krxdr.6.

Silver, Nate, Aaron Bycoffe, and Dhrumil Mehta. "How Popular Is Donald Trump?"

FiveThirtyEight, May 2, 2020. https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/trump-approval-

ratings/.

Thrush, Glenn, and Michael. "Trump Ruled the Tabloid Media. Washington Is a Different

Story." The New York Times. The New York Times, February 25, 2017.

https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/25/us/politics/trump-press-conflict.html.

"Tracking Trump: The President's Standing Across America." Morning Consult. Accessed

May 1, 2020. https://morningconsult.com/tracking-trump-2/.

Vogel, Kenneth P., and Jeremy W. Peters. "Trump Allies Target Journalists Over Coverage

Deemed Hostile to White House." The New York Times. The New York Times,

August 25, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/25/us/politics/trump-allies-news-

media.html.

"White House Bans CNN Reporter Jim Acosta after a Confrontation with Trump." CNBC.

CNBC, November 8, 2018. https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/08/white-house-bans-cnn-

reporter-jim-acosta-after-a-confrontation-with-trump-.html.

Wilson, Woodrow. *Constitutional government in the United States* (New York: Columbia

University Press, 1908), pp. 56-81