

Bryant University

HONORS THESIS



Risk Transfer Militarism and the Iraq War: A Case Study on the Military and Political Strategies Utilized by the Obama Administration during the Iraq War

ADVISOR • John Dietrich
EDITORIAL REVIEWER • Emily Copeland

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation
with honors in the Bryant University Honors Program
APRIL 2021

Table of Contents

Abstract	1
Introduction	2
Literature Review	5
Research Question:.....	5
Research Methodology.....	6
Potential Research Issues & Ethical Considerations.....	8
Case Study.....	10
Introduction	10
The Beginning Days of the Obama Administration.....	13
Risk Transfer Militarism	16
Restructuring of Military Programs	18
Establishment of Civilian and NGO Programs	22
Counterargument of Vietnamization.....	24
Conclusion	26
Appendix	28
Appendix A - Acronyms	29
References	30

ABSTRACT

President Barack Obama's military and political strategies during the withdrawal period from January 2009 to December 2011 of Operation Iraqi Freedom (IOF) effectively mitigated the risks of the U.S. forces stationed within the region while also ensuring influence over regional actors' trained military counterparts. By restructuring core military programs, leveraging civilian partnerships, and enacting new military doctrines, the U.S. engaged within the latest iteration of risk-transfer militarism.

INTRODUCTION

Following the national tragedy of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States urgently became aware of the urgency and strength of terrorist threats aimed at the nation. Consumed by the fear of spreading terror and the combined presumption of the weapons of mass destruction capabilities held by Iraq, the United States Congress passed the Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Force Against Iraq on October 16, 2002.¹ Building upon Congressional approval, the United States fully initiated Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), more commonly known as the Iraq War, with the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003.² With support from coalition government allies, the United States was able to overthrow Iraq President Saddam Hussain and draw insurgent forces out of Baghdad, the State's capital. However, Iraqi President Saddam Hussain was not captured and remained in hiding while insurgent coalitions regrouped within the surrounding regions.

After this initial invasion, the overconfidence of their military victory led President George W. Bush to declare "Mission Accomplished" aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln less than two months after the initial invasion.³ Unknown to the United States Military at the time, stationed ground forces would soon become intertwined within Iraq as civil unrest and insurgent activity flourished after the State became further destabilized. Even throughout several attempts at democratic interventions and nation-building, the region's polarized ethnic tensions held United States forces within the State with no clear path out of the war. As the United States had entered the war with the belief that the war was to only last in the 'short term', the belief among United States government and military officials was that the powers of democratization and quick military interventions would overcome all challenges.

² Anderson, Terry H. "9/11: Bush's Response." In *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Bailey Beth and Immerman Richard H., 54-74. NYU Press, 2015. Accessed March 5, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0q17.6.

³ Brigham, Robert K. "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq." In *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Bailey Beth and Immerman Richard H., 286-307. NYU Press, 2015

Thus no initial plans accounted for the possibilities of a drawn-out regional war that expanded upon the initial actors with the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.⁴

When President George W. Bush left office on January 20, 2009, newly elected President Barack Obama inherited the Iraq war and the regional tensions and ethnic tensions caused by his predecessors' military actions. Throughout President Barack Obama's campaign to his presidency, his platform was based on the belief that the United States should pull out of the war in Iraq and instead rely on meaningful diplomatic relations. Politically, the nation-wide support for the Iraq War had weakened over the years due to the United States casualties steadily increasing, failure of the surge military operations, and general feelings of regret over the initial intervention. The disdain for continued involvement in Iraq was confirmed by several national polls, including a poll released by CNN in June 2009. Two-thirds of respondents said the 'United States should not send troops back to Iraq even if violence increases significantly.'⁵ Thus, campaigning for the withdrawal of troops proved to be a strategic strategy for Barack Obama's campaign platform as he was further elected to become the 44th President of the United States. However, this support for the withdrawal of troops occurred several years before Barack Obama's presidential campaign, as then-Senator Barack Obama openly opposed the initial invasion of Iraq. On October 2, 2002, then state senator Barack Obama delivered remarks at a rally in Chicago where he stated that,

"I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale and without strong international support will only fan the flames of the Middle East, and encourage the worst, rather than best, impulses of the Arab world, and strengthen the recruitment arm of al-Qaida."⁶

The past beliefs of President Barack Obama became fruitful as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) ended on December 18, 2011, with all combat troops redeployed.⁷ In the end, the Iraq War

⁴ Cormier, Daniel J. "Will the United States learn from the Iraq War?" *Naval War College Review* 73, no. 1 (2020): 153-57. Accessed April 15, 2020. doi:10.2307/26868217.

⁵ Jacobson, Gary C. "A Tale of Two Wars: Public Opinion on the U.S. Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2010): 585-610. Accessed April 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23044842>.

⁶ Obama, Barack. "Transcript: Obama's Speech Against The Iraq War" NPR, January 20, 2009. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99591469>

⁷ Brennan, Richard R., Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben Connable, Terrence K. Kelly, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Young, Jason Campbell, K. Scott McMahon, and Ambassador James F. Jeffrey. "After the Transition." In *Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment*

lasted eight years, eight months, and twenty-eight days at the cost of 4,431 total United States personnel deaths⁸. While officially, the military operational capabilities of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) ended on December 18, 2011, the United States remained within the State with new goals of aiding in the democratic development and transition within the mission goals of Operation New Dawn (OND). Through rising insurgent activities and the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the United States stayed within Iraq to curb insurgent uprisings. As of January 2021, the United States still has 2,500 U.S. soldiers stationed within Iraq to support Iraq's fight against terrorism.⁹

Additionally, the incomprehensible costs of cultural devastation, societal trauma, and the actual number of Iraqi casualties still reign destruction in the region. When looking through the lens of American Foreign policy and Military Strategy, the Iraq War still is inclusive when considering the victor as the blurred triumphs of militarism extended far beyond the initial invasion. As the United States is currently still occupied within other States in the Middle East, the most significant victory in the Iraq War can be regarded as the withdrawal as the United States finally ended a war based on disputed claims.

In the withdrawal process, the Obama administration was able to revitalize the United States military by imposing a total restructuring of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Advise and Assistance development Brigades (AABs). In terms of private sector actions, the Obama Administration further developed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and U.S. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to increase regional ties and promote economic recovery. In culmination, these strategies and foreign policy decisions allowed the Obama Administration to engage in risk-transfer militarism, where the regional and civil tensions within the State continued to resolve without the usage of full-out military combat. Under the theory of risk transfer militarism, states can transfer the inherent risk of casualties within

of United States Forces-Iraq, 297-322. Rand Corporation, 2013. Accessed March 25, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhwfg.21.

⁸ <https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf>

⁹ Garamone, Jim. "U.S. Completes Troop-Level Drawdown in Afghanistan, Iraq" Department of Defense, January 15th, 2021. <https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2473884/us-completes-troop-level-drawdown-in-afghanistan-iraq/#:~:text=Troop%20levels%20in%20Iraq%20and,operations%20started%20there%20in%202001>.

their ranks during warfare to local, regional, and civilian forces through highly specialized training and doctrinal-based programs. Therefore, the concept of actualized warfare interventions further becomes complex as the bounds of warfare expand beyond a state's military capabilities. Through these military and political strategies, the Obama Administration was additionally able to withdraw forces from Iraq while also expanding and promoting the scope of American doctrinal and diplomatic foreign policy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Research Question:

Throughout this honor thesis, I seek to investigate and add to the body of literature analyzing the theme of President Barack Obama's military and political strategies within his presidency. Within the broad theme of foreign policy during the Obama Administration, I chose to focus on the military strategies the Obama Administration utilized to end the Iraq War and how these strategies and foreign policy decisions fit within my understanding of literature in political science. Following this research question, my honors thesis focused on the historical military strategies, administrative restructuring, and doctrinal changes that the Obama Administration leveraged during the withdrawal on Operation Iraqi Freedom and the development of Operation New Dawn. Within the early stages of my research, I found that few pieces of previous literature and publications on the Obama Administration during the withdrawal period of the Iraq War connected the foreign policy actions to the concept of risk transfer militarism. While risk transfer militarism is not a commonly used phrase within the political science academic community, it is vital to use this terminology which I argue is the best term to describe the strategies used during the withdrawal period.

Dr. Martin Shaw's book *The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and Its Crisis in Iraq* introduced me to the theory of risk transfer militarism. Dr. Martin Shaw expanded upon his teachings at the University of Sussex, England, and established the literature surrounding risk transfer militarism. In response to the growing entanglement within Iraq during the early 2000s, Dr. Martin Shaw sought to analyze the conditions of the conflict and how the western

powers changed the mechanism of warfare by introducing an economy of risk between military States and other regional actors.¹⁰

Furthermore, after reading Dr. Martin Shaw's book in late June 2020, I contacted him via email to ask several clarifying questions. In addition, I was able to ask him questions regarding the possibility of President Barack Obama using his mentioned risk transfer militarism techniques. From this conversation, Dr. Martin Shaw agreed that President Barack Obama followed the risk transfer model with specific mentions of his drone usage. Following this conversation, I decided to build my honors thesis and develop further arguments for the theory of risk-transfer militarism and bring forth additional applications and perspectives of the theory within a modern case study.

Contextually, every Presidential administration does not work in a vacuum. Therefore, it is essential within the finalized format of my thesis to note presidential studies and past regional disputes to understand the future foreign policy decisions of the United States and the possible diplomatic relations within the Middle East. Additionally, it is crucial to research military and political strategies during wartime because the actual applied methodology and doctrine of presidential administrations occur in the direst of circumstances. The difference in doctrine and actualized policy arises as military conflicts can sometimes become clouded by domestic issues, intel complications in addition to innumerable conditions. Therefore, I chose within my research question to focus on moments of crisis, when foreign policy is tested within the confounds of the real-world actions of other states and international actors.

Research Methodology

This thesis will further focus on a qualitative case study approach analyzing President Barack Obama's military and political decisions during the Iraq War's withdrawal period to investigate my research questions thoroughly. Specifically, I will be examining primary source documents released by the United States government on the withdrawal period and connecting this information to the theory of risk transfer militarism. The majority of analytical

¹⁰ Shaw, M. (2005). *The new Western way of war: Risk-transfer war and its crisis in Iraq*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

sources of the Iraq War were developed in the aftermath of the withdrawal, as the United States government waited to release and collect all available information suitable for public access. Understandably, the publications and knowledge that the United States government released to the public during the period of withdrawal invariably was reduced and heavily controlled as there were potential issues of the possible threats to national security. However, since the decade that the Iraq War military operations have ceased, the transparency in decision-making has increased, which will further lead to more literature and analysis in the future beyond the scope of this honors thesis. While I cannot seek a higher security clearance as I am a civilian researcher, the publications by the United States government do paint an accurate picture of the military and political decisions that complement the research in this thesis.

When considering political science research, my thesis will fit within the current body of literature within the Political Science community. This thesis is able to reside within precedent of previous publications within the academic community, as it approaches the 'how' and 'why' behind the actions of the Obama administration. Additionally, this thesis will deal comprehensively with the Obama Administration's decisions from public speeches and official governmental publications when deciding upon a format for the portrayal of my research. When considering research methodology for this thesis, I chose to focus on qualitative data because focusing on quantitative data of the Iraq War (i.e., Casualty analysis, Expenditure Analysis) does not fully work within the context of my qualitative research question. Furthermore, when deciding upon a format for the qualitative research, I chose to create a case study on the Iraq War withdrawal period that combined historical conditions, analysis of the Iraq War withdrawal period, and counterarguments for the theory of risk transfer militarism. In addition, the case study format will provide additional room for intellectual discussions within the academic community as others within the academic community have the opportunity to engage in discussions surrounding the validity of the arguments set forth.

One of the most important sources that I have collected is a volume on the United States Army in Iraq War compiled by Colonel Joel D. Rayburn and Colonel Frank K. Sobchak. This

two-volume collection published by the United States Army War College contains a comprehensive retelling of the Iraq War based on interviews, government publications, and media contributions¹¹. By including a significant government publication that comprehensively detailed all actions during the Iraq War, I found that evidence within my thesis became legitimized to the highest level of clearance available to civilians. Through this reasonably novel analysis, the retelling and body of knowledge around the Iraq War will increase as I demonstrate a new viewpoint of risk-transfer militarism.

In the pursuit of my research, I have also collected published reports from The United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). As one of the eleven unified combat commands of the Department of Defense, USCENTCOM was geographical in charge of the military operations during the Iraq War. These publications include daily and weekly press briefings and detailed operation information that was available to the public at that time. Additionally, these sources include statements by United States officials stationed within the region and provide a context of the regiments' experiences.

Potential Research Issues & Ethical Considerations

In terms of issues surrounding the data collection of this honors thesis, I do not see any foreseeable Institutional Review Board complications as I have established my thesis as a case study without the addition of personal surveys or interviews. The publications that I will be using for this thesis will only include officially published documents by the United States government and further peer-reviewed journal articles. The records and publications by USCENTCOM and the Department of Defense compiled by Military experts and contained declassified material at no risk or threats of national security. The secondary sources that I have selected for background information and further comparative analysis are peer-reviewed journal articles and selected chapters of books that scholarly authors have completed within political science and military science.

¹¹ Rayburn, Joel D., Frank K. Sobchak, Jeanne F. Godfroy, Matthew D. Morton, James S. Powell, and Matthew M. Zais, eds. *The U.S. Army In The Iraq War: Volume 2 Surge And Withdrawal 2007–2011*. Report. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2019. Xiii-xviii. Accessed April 30, 2020. doi:10.2307/resrep20102.2.

With complete transparency in mind, I have chosen not to use any unverified documents within my honors thesis research. The most famous and most significant leak of unverified military documents released during the Iraq war was the Iraq War Logs, which Wikileaks released in 2010. Within the Iraq War Logs, over 40,000 classified military documents have released to the public, eventually leading to the Iraq Body Count Project¹². While these leaked documents undoubtedly may include information about military activities during the Iraq War, I believe that ethically, it would be abhorrent if I used publications that had put American lives at risk when leaked.

¹² Brookes, Adam. "Wikileaks: Iraq War Logs 'Reveal Truth about Conflict'." BBC News. BBC, October 23, 2010. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11612731>

CASE STUDY

“We sent our troops to Iraq to do away with Saddam Hussein’s regime – and you got the job done. We kept our troops in Iraq to help establish a sovereign government – and you got the job done. And we will leave the Iraqi people with a hard-earned opportunity to live a better life – that is your achievement; that is the prospect that you have made possible.”

*President Barack Obama*¹³

Introduction

Ever since the development of the United States of America, the executive branch has relied heavily on isolationist foreign policy. Apart from several outliers in American foreign policy, including the strategic colonization attempts in Haiti and the Dominican Republic by President Theodore Roosevelt, the United States foreign policy as a collective whole was based upon isolationist policies set forward in President George Washington's farewell address in 1796. Furthermore, the international system up until the end of World War I did not contain the opportunities, interests, or channels for states to engage in widescale international relations. However, after the onset of World War II and the eventual progression of the Cold War, the United States became inexplicably intertwined within the international balancing act of democratic containment interventions and the following civil unrest. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Cold War's abrupt ending, the United States foreign policy shifted from containment strategies of communist development to a period of an undefined doctrinal foreign policy suitable for a newly multipolar world.

However, after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, President George W. Bush felt pressured to assert the United States military dominance and protect citizens against further attacks. Under the presidential leadership of President George W. Bush, the military doctrine within Iraq became rooted within the ideology of preemptive force. Under this preemptive force theory, the Bush Administration sought to impede not only imminent threats but also

¹³ Obama, Barack. “Responsible Ending the War in Iraq”. Remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-ndash-responsible-ending-war-iraq>

threats not fully matriculated¹⁴. The Bush Administration's wide-reaching 'war on terror' lacked a clearly defined enemy and failed to demonstrate an achievable yet meaningful end goal. Previous wars by the United States included a concrete and defined enemy that was a direct military subsidiary of a state or other clearly defined insurgent organization. In contrast, the 'war on terror' became waged against the ideology of terror, which flourished unconstrained within the Middle East. Neither states nor internationally recognized boundaries bound the extremist ideology.

By preventively striking Iraq in a bid to destabilize Saddam Hussain and preemptively ward off possible Weapons of Mass Destructions (WMD), the Bush Administration demonstrated the first key instance of what academics now classify as the Bush Doctrine. President George W. Bush followed in the footsteps of his father, President H.W. Bush, and became involved in the pursuit against Saddam Hussain just over a decade after his father. This modern definition of the President George W. Bush Doctrine, more commonly referred to as simply the Bush Doctrine, is categorized as a shift away from the previously held United States foreign policy of containment strategies and a push towards preemptive force against threats to the United States¹⁵. Most importantly, these preemptive forces aimed to circumvent threats that were consequently not fully ready for implantation nor matriculation. Furthermore, during The United States Military Academy of WestPoint's graduation address on June 2, 2002, President Bush declared,

"Deterrence -- the promise of massive retaliation against nations -- means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend... If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long"¹⁶.

The state failure of Iraq demonstrated to be inevitable as the Bush Administration believed that disbanding corrupt and extremist political institutions was necessary to bring forth a

¹⁴ Leffler, Melvyn P. "9/11 in Retrospect: George W. Bush's Grand Strategy, Reconsidered." *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011): 33-44. Accessed February 11, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23041774>.

¹⁵ Anderson, Terry H. "9/11: Bush's Response." In *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Bailey Beth and Immerman Richard H., 54-74. NYU Press, 2015. Accessed March 5, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0q17.6.

¹⁶ Bush, George "Graduation Speech at West Point". United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>

period of democratic transition needed to deter further terrorist organizations from gaining power within the region. As the external forces of the United States and coalition forces dismantled the state institutions, the state failure led to instability within the region as the Iraqi people faced the emergence of ethnic conflict due to unchecked civil tensions. As evident by the subsequent power vacuum in Iraq, the Iraqi State's eventual decline could not have occurred without the direct influx of western international influence.¹⁷ It then became the United States' responsibility to restore Iraq to become a legitimized State capable of conducting governance over its citizens before the United States left Iraq as the United States demolished the previous withstanding Iraqi political institutions.

As the state failure prompted more strife within the region, the people's uncertainty demonstrated to provide a surge in counterterrorism and terrorist activities that halted the United States' progress in the war¹⁸. After President George W. Bush declared victory over the fallen government, civil strife and tensions escalated to the height of a civil war. On top of the civil tensions within the region, the Bush Administration chose to move forward with nation-building efforts which ultimately undermined peace within the State and destabilized the economy of Iraq as a whole¹⁹.

Upon leaving office, President George W. Bush left behind a legacy of preemptive militarism and the potential of a stable diplomatic relationship with Iraq, based on the negotiations of the U.S. – Iraq Security Agreements in June 2008. However, even with the agreements set forth that the United States would remove forces from Iraq by December 31, 2011, President-Elect Barack Obama was forced to address the issue of strategically removing combat troops from Iraq while transferring the administrative and governmental capabilities back to the newly formed Iraqi government, under a framework which the previous administration signed. Within the framework of the U.S. – Iraq Security Agreement, the United States agreed within Article 4 to not infringe on the sovereignty of the Iraqi government by further conducting

¹⁷ Flibbert, Andrew. "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq." *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 1 (2013): 67-95. Accessed March 17, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/23563370.

¹⁸ Flibbert, Andrew. "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq."

¹⁹ Brigham, Robert K. "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq." In *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Bailey Beth and Immerman Richard H., 286-307. NYU Press, 2015. Accessed March 23, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0q17.16.

coordinated military operations under Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC). In addition, the United States agreed to only aid military operations supporting the stability of political institutions and the continued fight against al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.²⁰

Consequently, President-Elect Barack Obama was bound to the agreements of the past administration, which failed to contrive any military strategies other than a deadline to withdraw combat troops. While the Joint Military Operations Coordination Committee (JMOCC) was established to implement and assert the agreement, it failed to provide any guidance regarding a consolidated plan to withdraw United States combat forces safely. Therefore, President-Elect Barack Obama's presidential duty was to build upon the past foreign policy decisions to create a withdrawal plan within the confines of previous set deadlines as it would be imprudent for President-Elect Barack Obama to abandon previous diplomatic agreements. Compounding the withdrawal strategies, President-Elect Barack Obama was additionally keen on resolving his political ideology of expanding the scope and support of United States diplomatic relations, which was seen as a progressive change in doctrinal policy compared to his predecessor, President George W. Bush.

The Beginning Days of the Obama Administration

When President Barack Obama began his first day in office, there were 144,000 troops stationed within Iraq²¹. On President Barack Obama's first day in office, the administration commissioned the National Security Council (NSC) to comprehensively layout several withdrawal combat plan options from Iraq. The three possibilities created involved the United States leaving in either twenty-three months, nineteen months, or sixteen months. President Obama chose the 19 months of these three plans, emphasizing having the specific "combat" troops leaving Iraq within these 19 months. The decision to specify which troops remained in Iraq was necessary as the Obama Administration further decided to have troops staying within

²⁰ Mason, Chuck R. "U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight" Congressional Research Service. July 13 2009. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40011.pdf>

²¹ Office of the Press Secretary. "Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq". The White House, August 2nd, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/facts-and-figures-drawdown-iraq>

the region, albeit within a non-combat role²². When considering withdrawal plans, it was important for the United States to continue to provide support for the Iraqi government in a noncombatant role as stated within the U.S. – Iraq Security Agreement.²³

Furthermore, while promoting his plan on February 27, 2009, President Barack Obama gave remarks on responsibly ending the Iraq War to the Marines and Military personnel stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Most notably, President Obama offered insights on his intended plan to progress the United States' role within Iraq from a unilateral military presence to diplomatic support systems. President Obama openly admitted to the constraints of international law that currently held within the Iraq War, yet further explained that his belief was that,

"The long-term solution in Iraq must be political – not military. Because the most important decisions that have to be made about Iraq's future must now be made by Iraqis"²⁴

Following this speech, the Obama Administration followed a militarism model where the distinctions between State and Non-State actors became less clear, as the administration relied on both actors equally to provide a comprehensive withdrawal plan that included special attention to geopolitical conditions. This previously mentioned conflict style is more commonly referred to as 'surrogate militarism' within the Political Science academic community. The theory's foundation lies within burden-sharing and cooperation among State and Non-State Actors. Within the context of this case study, the term 'surrogate' applies to using another body or State to work on behalf of the United States interests. Therefore, Surrogate Militarism allows for indirect coordination based on doctrinal principles and not co-planning or exchanging resources.

²² Rayburn, Joel D., Frank K. Sobchak, Jeanne F. Godfroy, Matthew D. Morton, James S. Powell, and Matthew M. Zais, eds. Report. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2019.

²³ Mason, Chuck R. "U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight" Congressional Research Service. July 13 2009. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40011.pdf>

²⁴ Obama, Barack. "Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq". Remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-ndash-responsibly-ending-war-iraq>

However, I argue that the tying of the theory of surrogate militarism to the withdrawal period of the Iraq War fails to comprehensively examine and define the political and military actions of the Obama Administration. Within the case study of the Iraq War, the United States engaged beyond this traditional interpretation and included an economy of risk between non-state actors, regional forces, and civilian counterparts. The United States military leveraged the strengths of several actors into Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), the Iraqi Military, Private Businesses, and the United States to ensure a baseline level of support and influence²⁵. The introduction of several-non state actors as key players within the withdrawal of forces and the specialized military and political training of Iraqi security forces and government officials further demonstrated changing dynamics within Middle Eastern warfare.

Within the refinement of military actions and the introduction of diplomatic interventions, the Obama Administration effectively limited the potential risk of casualty to United States forces. Instead, it transferred this risk of militarism to their Iraqi counterparts and changed the economy of risk within warfare. By first closely detailing the true nature of risk transfer militarism and then providing critical examples of practices used by the Obama Administration, this thesis demonstrates that the United States trained parallel counterparts to engage in democratic bidding and state-formation in Iraq.

Furthermore, while the strategies utilized by the Obama Administration on the surface seem to echo the policies of Vietnamization used by President Richard Nixon during the Vietnam War, the Obama Administration instead learned from the missteps in withdrawal policy and included regional actor participation in the withdrawal process, which further demonstrates the novelty of the Iraq War withdrawal. Therefore, the United States military and political strategies utilized in the withdrawal from the Iraq War highlight the United States acceptance of the advancements in military development and provide further support for the continued inclusion of enhanced understandings of regional and political conditions in warfare combined with the continued support for regional and international non-state actors within modern warfare.

²⁵ Kreig, A. (2016), Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East. *International Affairs*, 92: 97-113. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12506>

Risk Transfer Militarism

Political Scientist and Sociologist Martin Shaw coined risk Transfer Militarism during the early 2000s in response to the Iraq War's initial invasion. Under this theory, this form of warfare innovation did not occur organically over time but happened due to carefully planned strategic media and weaponry management by Western powers. As a result of these choices, Western powers, most notably the United States, have effectively transferred the risk of warfare and harm of United States military personal to civilians and local forces. There is a heightened level of risk of casualties of personal and civilians within all warfare due to the proximity of mortal combaters and usage of highly lethal weaponry. Therefore, all wars, whether proxy or traditional, include this calculation of risk. These calculations of risk can be defined within an economy of risk, where the risks in warfare are not canceled out through military choices, but instead are transposed onto others, further circulating the risks of warfare. It is important to note that within this economy of risk, the risks within warfare are not diminished over time, but instead face different actors within warfare.²⁶ Historically, concept of having modern trained mercenaries trained in the doctrinal policy of larger States is not that considerably different from medieval warfare practices, albeit with more technological capabilities and increased totality of warfare. However, within the theory of risk transfer militarism, states do not pay for new actors directly like in the case of mercenaries, but instead equip them indirectly with provided training and weapons that do not include a historical payment of salary.

As the Western world developed this new level of militarism, the potential rewards for such innovation brought forth questions of the surrounding ethics of such militarism. While this unique style of militarism seems to bring safety and security to United States forces, it also leads to the further development of the military-industrial complex. Under this theory of the military-industrial complex, the United States can expand its military presence and capabilities without the potential consequence of casualties, lost assets, and lowered domestic support. Importantly, this transfer of risk does not effectively cancel out the potentials of mass

²⁶ Shaw, M. (2005). *The new Western way of war: Risk-transfer war and its crisis in Iraq*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

casualties or harm but actively transposes the risk of militarism onto other actors. Therefore, while looking at this style of militarism from the viewpoint of the United States, this innovation has allowed for safer warfare that has benefited the public perception of American foreign policy.

As a result of this style of militarism, the number of casualties and total accounted for harms of militarism becomes muddled, as official calculations of total costs are unable to occur. For example, during the trench militarism of World War I, both the Central Powers and the Allies faced human destruction as mass casualties were historically seen as an unpleasant yet inevitable side effect of militarism. While this transfer of risk and inherent aversion of risk can be linked to the parallel increase of ethics among the states in the international order, I would argue that it is more related to increased media coverage as the twenty-four-hour news cycle allows for the atrocities of warfare to process among news outlets continuously. As shown by the backlash among United States citizens during the media coverage of the Vietnam War, increased media perception of warfare causes distrust in politicians and lowered domestic support for overseas conflicts.

During the Iraq War and other campaigns within the Middle East, the total number of civilians and enemy combatants' casualties became less accounted for as the theatre in which the military campaigns changed. As the United States trained and equipped Iraqi Forces with United States military training, the war became fought less with the United States, but with the trained counterparts, whose casualties do not count against the official casualties accounted for by the United States government.²⁷ As within the writing of this thesis, there is no formally accounted or academically accepted collection of civilian casualties from the Iraq War as many experts dispute the actual number.

As a whole, the United States and Western Powers decided to adopt a military-style that best served their military and political goals. As evident by the reception of the American public by the travesty in Vietnam, the Western powers were forced to rethink their conventional theories surrounding warfare. The presence and influence of the media within Vietnam

²⁷ Shaw, Martin. "Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres and the Historic Legitimacy of War." *International Relations* 16, no. 3 (December 2002): 343–59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117802016003003>.

demonstrated that the United States had to be wearier in warfare, as their every move became watched nationally and globally.

Restructuring of Military Programs

"Going forward, a transitional force of U.S. troops will remain in Iraq with a different mission: advising and assisting Iraq's Security Forces, supporting Iraqi troops in targeted counterterrorism missions, and protecting our civilians"

*President Barack Obama*²⁸

While the semantics change of Operation Iraqi Freedom to Operation New Dawn hint at the changing circumstances within the military operations, the name change, and official ending of the Iraq War did not bring insurmountable change to the United States presence in the region. Specifically, Operation New Dawn entailed the United States military shifting from combat missions to create a continued working relationship between the United States military and their ISF counterparts. While some troops stationed within Iraq were still present within the region, they became notably reduced in occupational presence and scope in the daily lives of Iraqi citizens.

Most importantly, the United States military was tasked with advising, training, and equipping the ISF so that they would be able to leverage their form of counterinsurgency operations and establish their capabilities for national defense. In addition, Operation New Dawn tasked the troops stationed to ward off against terrorist groups and help advise, increase, and sustain the capacity of Iraqi governmental institutions. This training consisted of several administrative support levels, including civic engagement, military training, and medical training.

²⁸ Obama, Barack. "Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq" The White House, Washington, D.C., August 31, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq>

Advise and Assist Brigades

One of the most critical advancements within the military transition was highly specialized yet diverse and innovative transitional teams. Aided by Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) under the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs), the Iraqi soldiers within the 14th Provisional Transport Regiment received training in combat first aid, weapons, and military vehicle maintenance. Within this training, the Iraqi soldiers became required to demonstrate their proficiency in first aid and maintenance and care of weaponry. Still, the Iraqi soldiers were also required to pass modules to teach what they had learned to their American counterparts²⁹.

To accomplish the lofty mission goals, the United States military established seven Advise and Assist Brigades (AAB) and 50,000 ground station troops. These brigades received intensive pre-deployment training, which entailed Arabic language classes and civic management and administration. On top of their necessary military training, these brigades received specialized training that was not available to previous combat missions. These AABs were in place to provide peace and not defensive tactics against insurgent actors.

In addition to military support, these Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) aided in the legal development of Iraq. Under the Joint Expeditionary Forensics Facility 1 (JEFF 1), United States soldiers developed the forensics capability within Iraq's criminal justice and medical systems. At the time of the development of the JEFF 1 facility in the spring of 2009, the Iraqi court system did not accept nor leverage forensic evidence within their judicial system. Within judicial proceedings, neither guilt nor innocence was to be decided based upon forensic evidence, which United States judicial proceedings had accepted since the early 20th century. Within a joint statement between the United States and Iraq, the United States further articulated that this legal support was necessary as,

“The United States and the Iraq believe that an independent judicial system is an essential component of a stable, democratic Iraq. The United States has provided assistance and professional support to develop and professionalize the Iraqi

²⁹ Lawrence, Pfc. J. Princeville. “U.S. forces train Iraqis to train others” U.S. Central Command, October 25th 2009. Accessed February 16th, 2021. <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/883938/us-forces-train-iraqis-to-train-others/>

corrections system through judicial training programs for Iraqis through the Judicial Development Institute.”³⁰

This Judicial Development Institute further combined the addition of civilian counterparts to leverage the collaboration of civilian social scientists. Within these teams, social scientists, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists worked together to analyze Iraq's local political and economic climates. These civilian scientists were able to take a comprehensive, unbiased perspective that provided transitional teams support in completing their assigned tasks. The United States government was able to justify the expense. This additional support was engineered to help stabilize and further continue the United States' influence within the region.

Outside of legal training, several of the AAB teams were tasked with aiding in the medical development of the region. Within the 10th Combat Support Hospital, the coalition troops aided in general medical development within the community. Army Maj. Deydre Teyhen, who is in physical therapist by trade, added to the medical development in the hospital by helping patients with muscular and skeletal issues as Iraq faced medical and physician shortages in the wake of the initial conflict. The United States medical practitioners aided in developing clinical practice standards and management of information and patient care³¹.

Within the 2nd Brigade Team in northern Iraq, Iraqi medics within Kirkuk were given training on battlefield medical trauma and sustainment care. These training courses included medical training on addressing and triaging medical wounds, treating fractures, and administering intravenous fluids (IV). At the end of the training, the Iraqi medics received the U.S. Army Combat Lifesaver Course and Tactical Combat Casualty Care equivalent. This certification is

³⁰ The Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint Statement by The United States of America and The Republic of Iraq Higher Coordinating Committee” The White House, November 30th, 2011. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/30/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-iraq-higher-coordinat>

³¹ ³¹ American Forces Press Service. “Troops train Iraqis in forensic techniques” U.S. Central Command. April 16th, 2009. Accessed February 16th, 2021. <https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/883827/troops-train-iraqis-in-forensic-techniques/>

considered to provide training beyond civilian Advanced Emergency Medical Technicians' level and requires all Army medics stationed within Army Brigades³².

Overall, the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) significantly changed the dynamics in warfare within Iraq. While the United States was no longer providing combat assistance in Iraq, they did provide military support to bolster and stabilize the Iraqi governmental institutions. While the United States continued presence can be viewed as an imperialist power introducing the ideals of democratic governance to a newly established State, the true intention behind such military programs was to instill governmental support and stability for the future. In truth, the Iraqi government laid the majority of the groundwork for governmental development and created a critical partnership with the United States military programs to avert future unrest and stability for the benefit of Iraq, the Middle East, and the United States.

Therefore, it is evident that the fight against extremist terrorism and insurgency is an issue beyond the bounds of the Iraq War due to the interconnected relationship between extremist terrorist threats, the Middle East, and the United States. By providing support and governmental training, the United States was able to still engage in warfare against terrorism, but at the cost of the training of Iraqi forces as the Iraqi forces were to have a continued fight against terrorism within their State boundaries. While the fight against terrorism is vital for Iraqi government officials as the extremists caused death and destruction among the State, it was also increasingly important for the United States to leave behind institutions that could fight insurgency in Iraq while still quelling insurgent forces the opportunities to grow in strength.

United States Security Force Assistants

In addition, the Obama Administration built upon the United States Security Force Assistants (SFA) and expanded their emerging role within the middle east. The United States military supplied tens of thousands of troops and military support to the ISF in preparation for the near

³² American Forces Press Service. "Troops train Iraqis in forensic techniques" U.S. Central Command. April 16th, 2009. Accessed February 16th, 2021.

future withdrawal of U.S. forces in the State. The Security Force Assistants received embedded military transition teams (MiTTs), specific military partnering of essential functions, and even formal training³³. These Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) worked in cohesion with the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to enact smooth retreatment of United States forces in the region and allow for the transitioning of power back to Iraqi institutions upon retreatment. Under this new transitional period, the MNF-I were stripped of their unilateral abilities and were obligated to engage with their Iraqi perspective counterparts. This engagement, including collaboration with Iraqi legal institutions as members of the MNF-I secured warrants under the Iraqi government and execute operations jointly based on shared intelligence³⁴.

Establishment of Civilian and NGO Programs

"As our military draws down, our dedicated civilians -- diplomats, aid workers, and advisors -- are moving into the lead to support Iraq as it strengthens its government, resolves political disputes, resettles those displaced by war, and builds ties with the region and the world."

*President Barack Obama*³⁵

In terms of anticipated regional issues surrounding the withdrawal, the Obama Administration focused on developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to perform capitalistic endeavors. Under the Bush Administration, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice established the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 2005 in efforts to introduce cooperation between political, military, economic experts and Iraqi governmental officials³⁶. However,

³³ Stephen Biddle, Julia Macdonald & Ryan Baker (2018) Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41:1-2,89-142, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745>

³⁴ Brennan, Richard R., Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben Connable, Terrence K. Kelly, Michael J. Mcnerney, Stephanie Young, Jason Campbell, K. Scott mcMahon, and AMBASSADOR JAMES F. JEFFREY. "Multi-National Force-Iraq Transition Planning and Execution, 2009-2010." In *Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq*, 65-78. RAND Corporation, 2013. Accessed March 01, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhwfg.12

³⁵ Obama, Barack. "Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq" The White House, Washington, D.C., August 31, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq>

³⁶ United States Institute of Peace. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq" March 20, 2013. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2013/03/provincial-reconstruction-teams-iraq>

these initial teams were greatly expanded upon by the Obama Administration. Throughout the transition under the Obama Administration, there were close to 900 civilian partners within the region actively working on safeguarding the retreatment of the United States. For the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), there was an emphasis on expanding foreign direct investment and mediating communal tensions to ensure 'honest brokers' during the transition process³⁷.

Most importantly, these Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) allowed for comprehensive support that expanded beyond the scope of the Advise and Assist and Brigades (AABs). While the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) were keenly trained to support and establish ties between the United States military and the Iraqi government and security forces, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) brought forth a more contextual approach to their partnership by relying on civilians and governmental experts within education, business management and agricultural innovation, among many other sectors. As these Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were led by the State Department Foreign Service Officers, they were extensively trained and specifically chosen to establish relationships with Iraqi government officials to aid in systematic development of the economic, political, and social development of the State. In addition, the participation of the United States military within the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) was limited to only one deputy leader, liaison officers and civil affairs soldiers within teams.

The civil engagement of society expanded to U.S. non-governmental organizations (NGOs) funded by the United States Department of State further engaged in the retreatment process by maintaining peace projects within Iraq. The most active nonprofit organizations were the U.S. Institute of Peace and the National Endowment for Democracy's constituent groups, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute funded by congressional support. In addition, the U.S. Institute of Peace worked closely with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

³⁷ Laipson, Ellen. The Future of US-Iraq Relations. Report. Stimson Center, 2010. 1-18. Accessed March 12, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10922.6

Through the lens of reconstruction, programs lead by the Obama Administration and the research demonstrated that the administration had a clear intent of peacefully moving away from the decade-long war. The administration explicitly leveraged both the private and nonprofit sector leaders to ensure that military retreatment did not cause the region to fall into ruin. Within a joint press conference with Prime Minister al-Maliki of Iraq, President Barack Obama committed the nation to expand the two nations' relationships. President Barack Obama articulated that,

“We’re partnering to expand our trade and commerce. We’ll make it easier for our businesses to export and innovate together. We’ll share our experiences in agriculture and in health care. We’ll work together to develop Iraq’s energy sector even as the Iraqi economy diversifies, and we’ll deepen Iraq’s integration into the global economy.”³⁸

Therefore, the United States was able to stabilize Iraq while still allowing their trained Iraqi officials to continue to doctrinal goals of American foreign policy. Admittedly, the Obama Administration was aware that while wars historically had been traditionally fought to secure peace, the new modern iteration of international peace could only be accomplished with diplomatic actions that considered the economic and historical ties between nations. It is also essential to note that while the United States was able to remove combatant troops from Iraq during the withdrawal period, the fight for democracy and viewpoints of the United States was continuously fought daily as the United States fostered further development within the State.

Counterargument of Vietnamization

When looking at the overall withdrawal plan utilized by the United States government in the ending of the Iraq War, several parallels can be drawn between the Iraq War and the conclusion of the Vietnam War. During a similarly unpopular war, President Richard Nixon proposed a phased withdrawal from Vietnam in March 1969, which was later referred to as

³⁸Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister al-Maliki of Iraq in a Joint Press Conference”. The White House, December 12th, 2011. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/12/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-al-maliki-iraq-joint-press-co>

Vietnamization. Under this phased withdrawal, President Nixon emphasized establishing coalition support and training between the United States military and the Republic of Vietnam Army³⁹. While this withdrawal policy seems similar to the United States military and political strategies utilized during the withdrawal of the Iraq War, the application, true intent, and eventual outcome of the withdrawal policies differ between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War.

During the withdrawal of the Vietnam War, President Nixon's plan of Vietnamization proved to be a contractionary policy as the United States government did not fully transition to noncombatant missions and still engaged in military combat during the withdrawal period. During the withdrawal period of March 1969 until the end of the Vietnam War, the United States was involved in military operations outside of the state boundaries of Vietnam. Included within these military operations was secretly bombing Cambodians in attempts to circumvent the Ho Chi Minh Trail.⁴⁰ Additionally, the withdrawal from Vietnam War, two contrasting plans ensued as the Pentagon continued the troop withdrawal plan by the beginning of 1970, and United States diplomats advocating for mutual withdrawal between the United States and the North Vietnamese. The contrast in the application within Vietnam and the international relations between the North Vietnamese and the United States demonstrated a fragmented withdrawal policy⁴¹.

Comparatively, during the withdrawal of the Iraq War, the United States was not engaging in combatant missions and instead focused all of their military capabilities within Iraq to ensure a smooth transition from combatant to support missions. While the United States was still engaged within Afghanistan, it is also imperative to note that those two conflicts should not be tied together when considering the withdrawal from Iraq because the United States has remained within Afghanistan due to this publication's date.

³⁹ Kimball Jeffrey P. and Anderson David L. "Richard M. Nixon and the Vietnam War: The Paradox Of Disengagement With Escalation." *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*. 217-44. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Accessed April 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/ande13480.12>.

⁴⁰ Kimball Jeffrey P. and Anderson David L. "Richard M. Nixon and the Vietnam War: The Paradox Of Disengagement With Escalation."

⁴¹ McMahon, Robert J. "The Politics, and Geopolitics, of American Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968–1972." *Diplomatic History* 34, no. 3 (2010): 471-83. Accessed April 22, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24915894>.

In addition, Vietnamization also lacked an understanding of regional capabilities and failed to promote relationships between the United States government and Vietnam political institutions. Within the planning stages of Vietnamization, the United States government could not understand the actualities of withdrawal. Within the withdrawal process, the United States did not consider establishing relationships and counterinsurgency tactics within the withdrawal plan would be beneficial. The counterinsurgency tactics within Vietnamization were unable to provide one of the critical requirements of counterinsurgency tactics, a population or group of individuals committed to the government. As the United States continued to engage in warfare within Vietnam, the military failed to develop relationships with the Republic of Vietnam Army and the civilians within Vietnam⁴². Admittedly, the United States was unable to understand and develop its policy in counterinsurgency due to the nature of the warfare. However, it still is important to note that the eventual progression of modern counterinsurgency doctrine is rooted within the failures during the Vietnam War.

Within the withdrawal of the Iraq War, the United States leveraged counterinsurgency tactics by engaging in close collaboration with the Iraqi government and security forces. As was evident by the failure of Vietnamization, the United States developed a withdrawal plan that included a straightforward collaboration of support that aided in the future stability of the Middle East. In addition, under the Obama Administration, the United States explicitly utilized support from civilian and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

While the withdrawal period of the Iraq War shows demonstrates similarities to Vietnamization utilized by President Richard Nixon, it is clear that the withdrawal strategies used during the withdrawal of the Iraq war built upon mistakes from the past and demonstrate that the United States military progressed through a more modern iteration of warfare.

Conclusion

By restructuring core military programs, leveraging civilian partnerships, and enacting new military doctrines, the United States engaged within the latest iteration of Risk Transfer

⁴² Miller, Paul D. Withdrawal Deadlines In War: Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Report. Atlantic Council, 2020. 4-12. Accessed April 30, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24664.4>.

Militarism. Through this theory of warfare, the United States provided Iraqi Security Forces with the training and equipment of highly specialized U.S. military personnel to maintain influence over the region while still engaging in the withdrawal of combat troops. While Risk Transfer Militarism seems analogous to Vietnamization, in truth, the United States military under President Barack Obama understood the failures of this past policy and instead built upon the previous flaws of insufficient counterinsurgency tactics and limited regional development. Through this redevelopment of military strategies, the United States government engaged within a new economy of risk, which introduced risk-transfer militarism.

The training and support of Iraqi security forces, governmental officials, and civilians allowed the United States to have continued influence over the region and engage in an innovative version of warfare where there was less emphasis on military offensives but more on preemptive training and support. Therefore, the United States was allowed to engage within a new iteration of warfare where the risks of casualties to personal were reduced. At the same time, the influence of United States doctrine was still enshrouded within the region.

Furthermore, the withdrawal period of the Iraq War needs to be further studied as more military information becomes declassified by the United States government. Within the literature of political science, this application of the Iraq War and Risk Transfer Militarism withdrawal period has not yet been demonstrated, which I argue is essential when considering the future of American conflicts within foreign policy.

APPENDIX

Appendix A - Acronyms

AAB	Advise and Assist Brigades
ISF	Iraqi Security Forces
FSO	Foreign Security Officer
JET	Joint Expenditure Training
MiTT	Military Transition Teams
MNF-1	Multi-National Force-Iraq
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND	Operation New Dawn
PRTs	Provincial Reconstruction Teams
SFA	United States Security Force Assistants
SOF	American Special Operations
USCENTCOM	United States Central Command

REFERENCES

- American Forces Press Service. "Troops train Iraqis in forensic techniques" U.S. Central Command. April 16, 2009. Accessed February 16, 2021.
<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/883827/troops-train-iraqis-in-forensic-techniques/>
- Anderson, Terry H. "9/11: Bush's Response." In *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Bailey Beth and Immerman Richard H., 54-74. NYU Press, 2015. Accessed March 5, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0q17.6.
- Biddle, Stephen, Julia Macdonald & Ryan Baker (2018) Small footprint, small payoff: The military effectiveness of security force assistance, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41:1-2, 89-142, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2017.1307745>
- Brennan, Richard R., Charles P. Ries, Larry Hanauer, Ben Connable, Terrence K. Kelly, Michael J. McNerney, Stephanie Young, Jason Campbell, K. Scott McMahan, and Ambassador James F. Jeffrey. "After the Transition." In *Ending the U.S. War in Iraq: The Final Transition, Operational Maneuver, and Disestablishment of United States Forces-Iraq*, 297-322. Rand Corporation, 2013. Accessed March 25, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt5hhwfg.21.
- Brighman, Robert K. "The Lessons and Legacies of the War in Iraq." In *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Bailey Beth and Immerman Richard H., 286-307. NYU Press, 2015.
- Brookes, Adam. "Wikileaks: Iraq War Logs 'Reveal Truth about Conflict'." BBC News. BBC, October 23, 2010. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11612731>
- Bush, George "Graduation Speech at West Point". United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002. <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>
- Cormier, Daniel J. "Will the United States learn from the Iraq War?" *Naval War College Review* 73, no. 1 (2020): 153-57. Accessed April 15, 2020. doi:10.2307/26868217.
- Flibbert, Andrew. "The Consequences of Forced State Failure in Iraq." *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 1 (2013): 67-95. Accessed March 17, 2020.
www.jstor.org/stable/23563370.

The Leadership and Legacy of the Obama Administration in the context of the
Withdrawal of the Iraq War

Honors Thesis for Kathleen Bannon

- Garamone, Jim. "U.S. Completes Troop-Level Drawdown in Afghanistan, Iraq" Department of Defense, January 15, 2021
<https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2473884/us-completes-troop-level-drawdown-in-afghanistan-iraq/#:~:text=Troop%20levels%20in%20Iraq%20and,operations%20started%20there%20in%202001.>
- Immerman, Richard H. "Intelligence and the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan." In *Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan*, edited by Bailey Beth and Immerman Richard H., 77-98. NYU Press, 2015. Accessed March 23, 2020.
[Www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0q17.7](http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0q17.7)
- Jacobson, Gary C. "A Tale of Two Wars: Public Opinion on the U.S. Military Interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 40, no. 4 (2010): 585-610. Accessed April 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23044842>.
- Kimball Jeffrey P. and Anderson David L. "Richard M. Nixon and the Vietnam War: The Paradox Of Disengagement With Escalation." *The Columbia History of the Vietnam War*. 217-44. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. Accessed April 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/ande13480.12>.
- Kreig, A. (2016), Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. *International Affairs*, 92: 97-113.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12506>
- Lawrence, Pfc. J. Princeville. "U.S. forces train Iraqis to train others" U.S. Central Command, October 25 2009. Accessed February 16, 2021.
<https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/NEWS-ARTICLES/News-Article-View/Article/883938/us-forces-train-iraqis-to-train-others/>
- Leffler, Melvyn P. "9/11 in Retrospect: George W. Bush's Grand Strategy, Reconsidered." *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 5 (2011): 33-44. Accessed February 11, 2021.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23041774>.
- Laipson, Ellen. *The Future of US-Iraq Relations*. Report. Stimson Center, 2010. 1-18. Accessed March 12, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10922.6
- Mason, Chuck R. "U.S.-Iraq Withdrawal/Status of Forces Agreement: Issues for Congressional Oversight" Congressional Research Service. July 13 2009.
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40011.pdf>
- Mcmahon, Robert J. "The Politics, and Geopolitics, of American Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968–1972." *Diplomatic History* 34, no. 3 (2010): 471-83. Accessed April 22, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/24915894>.

The Leadership and Legacy of the Obama Administration in the context of the
Withdrawal of the Iraq War
Honors Thesis for Kathleen Bannon

- Miller, Paul D. *Withdrawal Deadlines In War: Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan*. Report. Atlantic Council, 2020. 4-12. Accessed April 21, 2021. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24664.4>.
- Obama, Barack. "Address to the Nation on the End of Combat Operations in Iraq" The White House, Washington, D.C., August 31, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/08/31/remarks-president-address-nation-end-combat-operations-iraq>
- Obama, Barack. "Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq". Remarks, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, February 27, 2009. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-ndash-responsibly-ending-war-iraq>
- Obama, Barack. "Transcript: Obama's Speech Against The Iraq War" NPR, January 20, 2009. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99591469>
- Office of the Press Secretary. "Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq". The White House, August 2, 2010. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/facts-and-figures-drawdown-iraq>
- Office of the Press Secretary. "Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister al-Maliki of Iraq in a Joint Press Conference". The White House, December 12, 2011. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/12/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-al-maliki-iraq-joint-press-co>
- Office of the Press Secretary. "Joint Statement by The United States of America and The Republic of Iraq Higher Coordinating Committee" The White House, November 30, 2011. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/11/30/joint-statement-united-states-america-and-republic-iraq-higher-coordinat>
- Rayburn, Joel D., Frank K. Sobchak, Jeanne F. Godfroy, Matthew D. Morton, James S. Powell, and Matthew M. Zais, eds. *The U.S. Army In The Iraq War: Volume 2 Surge And Withdrawal 2007–2011*. Report. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2019. Xiii-xviii. Accessed April 30, 2020. doi:10.2307/resrep20102.2.
- Shaw, Martin. "Risk-Transfer Militarism, Small Massacres and the Historic Legitimacy of War." *International Relations* 16, no. 3 (December 2002): 343–59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117802016003003>.
- Shaw, Martin. "The new Western way of war: Risk-transfer war and its crisis in Iraq" Cambridge: Polity Press. 2005
- Stanley, Bruce E. "Operation Iraqi Freedom". In *Outsourcing Security: Private Military Contractors and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 127-59. University of Nebraska Press, 2015. Accessed March 5, 2020. www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1d9nhv7.12.

The Leadership and Legacy of the Obama Administration in the context of the
Withdrawal of the Iraq War

Honors Thesis for Kathleen Bannon

United States Institute of Peace. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq" March 20, 2013.
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2013/03/provincial-reconstruction-teams-iraq>