Variability in Cashflows and Returns and CEO Pay
Document Type
Article
Keywords
CEO compensation; risk; cash flow; returns; compensation structure
Identifier Data
https://www.proquest.com/docview/2554668680/fulltext/923322F55C0247DDPQ/1?accountid=36823
Publisher
The Journal of Theoretical Accounting Research
Publication Source
The Journal of Theoretical Accounting Research Fall 2021
Abstract
I use a version of the principal-agent model to examine how closely empirical CEO compensation hews to agency theoretic predictions. Assuming a risk averse manager, and an asymptotically risk neutral principal, the Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) model prescribes that the principal should shift compensation more toward cash as volatility in returns increases and toward non-cash, more variable, compensation as volatility in returns declines. I examine these prescriptions in terms of fixed and variable pay and in terms of current and non-current pay. I find support for broad predictions of the model with regard to the pay-performance relation but weaker support with regard to the structure. Specifically, as risk increases, the pay-performance relation decreases, but the variable portion of pay tends to increase with risk contrary to theoretical prediction. I provide alternative explanations for perceived or real inefficiency in CEO compensation.
